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  INTRODUCTION	  	   The	  Snow	  Revolution	  that	  swept	  through	  the	  streets	  of	  central	  Moscow	  in	  the	  winter	  of	  2011-­‐2012	  brought	  little	  change	  to	  Russia’s	  existing	  political	  regime.	  A	  power	  shift	  did	  not	  follow;	  instead,	  the	  country	  saw	  extensive	  arrests	  of	  protesters	  followed	  by	  generous	  prison	  sentences.	  The	  opposition,	  never	  particularly	  pampered	  by	  the	  government,	  encountered	  even	  harsher	  treatment	  by	  the	  regime.	  But	  despite	  such	  a	  gloomy	  start,	  a	  year	  later,	  in	  January	  2013,	  more	  than	  80,000	  people	  gathered	  in	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  city	  for	  a	  so-­‐called	  “march	  against	  scoundrels.”1	  These	  protesters	  were	  very	  similar	  to	  the	  ones	  who	  took	  to	  the	  streets	  in	  December	  2011—middle-­‐aged,	  well-­‐educated	  people	  with	  very	  liberal	  views	  and	  negative	  attitudes	  to	  Vladimir	  Putin.2	  Their	  discontent	  gradually	  translated	  into	  far-­‐from-­‐perfect	  presidential	  approval	  ratings;	  by	  the	  end	  of	  2013,	  Putin’s	  popularity	  level	  had	  dipped	  to	  an	  all-­‐time	  low	  of	  61%.	  	  In	  March	  2014,	  right	  after	  Putin	  proudly	  announced	  that	  as	  a	  result	  of	  a	  highly	  controversial	  referendum	  Crimea	  has	  “rejoined	  Russia,”	  Putin’s	  popularity	  increased	  dramatically,	  reaching	  80%.	  The	  country’s	  population	  was	  passionately	  supportive	  of	  Russia’s	  politics:	  according	  to	  the	  independent	  Levada	  Center,	  close	  to	  90%	  of	  respondents	  said	  they	  were	  proud	  and	  happy	  about	  the	  move.	  In	  the	  course	  of	  the	  next	  few	  months	  Russians	  were	  gradually	  introduced	  to	  new	  sanctions	  imposed	  by	  the	  US	  and	  the	  EU,	  Russia’s	  unexpected	  import	  bans	  and	  creative	  laws.	  And	  yet	  in	  August	  2014,	  about	  86%	  of	  Russians	  said	  they	  approved	  of	  the	  president’s	  actions	  –	  an	  astonishing	  number	  even	  for	  Putin.	  What	  seemed	  even	  more	  astonishing	  was	  that	  numerous	  well-­‐educated	  middle-­‐aged	  liberals,	  the	  ones	  who	  just	  12	  months	  earlier	  were	  holding	  signs	  that	  read	  “Shame	  on	  You,	  Putin!	  Go	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2013/01/12_a_4920953.shtml	  	  
2	  http://www.levada.ru/07-­‐02-­‐2013/opros-­‐na-­‐marshe-­‐protiv-­‐podletsov-­‐13-­‐yanvarya	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away!”	  were	  now	  among	  those	  who	  supported	  the	  president.	  The	  country	  seemed	  to	  be	  experiencing	  the	  so-­‐called	  rally-­‐round-­‐the-­‐flag	  effect.	  	  The	  instance	  of	  a	  rallying	  event	  in	  Russia	  poses	  two	  important	  questions:	  Who	  are	  the	  people	  who	  passionately	  opposed	  the	  ruling	  regime	  just	  a	  year	  before,	  but	  in	  2014	  changed	  their	  mind	  about	  the	  president?	  And	  why	  did	  some	  of	  these	  individuals	  change	  their	  opinions	  about	  Vladimir	  Putin	  and	  turn	  from	  passionate	  oppositionists	  into	  eager	  regime	  supporters?	  In	  this	  paper	  I	  use	  panel	  data	  analysis	  to	  solve	  the	  first	  half	  of	  this	  complex	  puzzle:	  understanding	  who	  rallied	  around	  the	  Russian	  flag	  would	  allow	  me	  to	  take	  the	  next	  step	  and	  explain	  what	  reasons	  were	  behind	  this	  relatively	  abrupt	  opinion	  change.	  I	  find	  that	  in	  the	  Russian	  case	  three	  main	  factors	  serve	  as	  strong	  predictors	  of	  rallying	  and	  distinguish	  those	  who	  changed	  their	  mind:	  attention	  to	  state	  TV,	  seeing	  oneself	  as	  Russia’s	  patriot	  and	  favorably	  assessing	  one’s	  family	  finances	  or	  the	  change	  in	  the	  financial	  situation.	  	  The	  results	  place	  Russia	  close	  to	  the	  US,	  which	  has	  been	  the	  main	  focus	  of	  rally-­‐round-­‐the-­‐flag	  literature	  so	  far.	  However,	  the	  paper	  emphasizes	  a	  number	  of	  important	  differences	  that	  might	  have	  meaningful	  implications	  for	  the	  study	  of	  public	  opinion	  in	  competitive	  authoritarian	  regimes	  as	  well	  as	  for	  Western	  policy-­‐makers	  attempting	  to	  open	  a	  dialogue	  with	  Russia	  and	  influence	  its	  highly	  controversial	  foreign	  politics.	  The	  fact	  that	  unlike	  the	  US	  only	  those	  whose	  finances	  had	  improved	  around	  the	  time	  of	  the	  crisis	  rallied	  in	  Russia	  allows	  me	  to	  highlight	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  state	  of	  the	  country’s	  economy	  for	  the	  president’s	  popularity	  at	  a	  time	  of	  crisis.	  However,	  the	  overwhelming	  significance	  of	  patriotic	  feelings	  and	  the	  unabated	  popularity	  of	  Putin	  despite	  the	  worsening	  economic	  conditions	  point	  to	  the	  equal	  salience	  of	  national	  pride	  in	  the	  rallying	  situation.	  It	  thus	  accentuates	  the	  biggest	  difference	  between	  Russia	  and	  the	  US:	  the	  yet	  unresolved	  opposition	  between	  the	  factor	  of	  economic	  grievances	  and	  that	  of	  patriotism	  in	  Putin’s	  Russia.	  The	  power	  of	  the	  patriotism	  frame,	  in	  turn,	  could	  give	  an	  answer	  to	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  puzzle:	  the	  shift	  of	  opinion	  even	  among	  regime	  opponents	  might	  happen	  when	  the	  focus	  moves	  from	  the	  strictly	  domestic	  environment	  into	  the	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sphere	  of	  international	  politics,	  and	  the	  patriotism	  frame	  gets	  activated	  in	  the	  face	  of	  a	  foreign	  threat	  to	  the	  country.	  	  The	  rest	  of	  the	  thesis	  is	  divided	  into	  six	  parts.	  First,	  I	  give	  a	  general	  overview	  of	  the	  rallying	  phenomenon	  in	  both	  democracies	  and	  authoritarian	  regimes.	  Second,	  I	  analyze	  the	  implications	  of	  this	  paper	  for	  future	  research	  of	  the	  phenomenon	  in	  the	  Russian	  regime	  and	  look	  at	  the	  existing	  literature	  on	  the	  rally-­‐round-­‐the-­‐flag	  effect.	  Third,	  I	  consider	  the	  role	  of	  the	  media	  in	  affecting	  individuals’	  likelihood	  to	  rally.	  Fourth,	  I	  evaluate	  the	  applicability	  of	  the	  results	  presented	  in	  the	  US-­‐focused	  literature	  to	  the	  Russian	  case.	  Fifth,	  I	  generate	  a	  number	  of	  hypotheses	  based	  on	  the	  existing	  research	  and	  test	  them	  on	  the	  example	  of	  Russia.	  Sixth,	  I	  evaluate	  the	  results	  and	  conclude	  with	  a	  general	  discussion,	  considering	  also	  alternative	  explanations	  of	  Putin’s	  increased	  popularity.	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  GENERAL	  FRAMEWORK	  	  The	  existence	  of	  a	  rally-­‐round-­‐the-­‐flag	  effect	  has	  been	  widely	  recognized	  by	  scholars.	  They	  agree	  that	  international	  conflicts	  (followed	  by	  potentially	  threatening	  situations)	  have	  a	  significant	  effect	  on	  sociopolitical	  attitudes	  and	  cause	  the	  popularity	  of	  a	  country’s	  leader	  to	  surge	  upwards.	  But	  while	  the	  effect’s	  existence	  is	  not	  disputed,	  its	  nature	  and	  internal	  mechanisms	  are	  not	  that	  obvious.	  In	  his	  groundbreaking	  paper	  Presidential	  Popularity	  from	  Truman	  to	  Johnson	  that	  focused	  solely	  on	  the	  Unites	  States,	  John	  Mueller	  defined	  which	  events	  are	  capable	  of	  leading	  to	  rallying	  around	  the	  flag.	  According	  to	  his	  definition,	  a	  rally	  event:	  “(1)	  is	  international;	  (2)	  involves	  the	  United	  States	  and	  particularly	  the	  President	  directly;	  and	  (3)	  is	  specific,	  dramatic,	  and	  sharply	  focused.”	  Other	  political	  scientists	  have	  subsequently	  applied	  the	  concept	  broadly	  and	  tested	  its	  applicability	  on	  a	  number	  of	  different	  foreign	  crises	  that	  led	  the	  population	  to	  briefly	  but	  decisively	  support	  the	  president.	  The	  key	  disagreement,	  however,	  continued	  to	  revolve	  around	  the	  question	  of	  who	  changes	  her/his	  opinion	  about	  the	  country’s	  leader	  and	  rallies	  round	  the	  flag,	  and	  why.	  	  Today,	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  existing	  literature	  on	  the	  effect	  continues	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  US.	  Supporting	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  rally	  phenomenon,	  a	  strong	  causal	  link	  is	  believed	  to	  exist	  between	  the	  country’s	  unsatisfactory	  domestic	  political	  conditions	  and	  its	  intrusive	  foreign	  policy.	  Earlier	  research	  has	  demonstrated	  that	  domestic	  circumstances	  can	  indeed	  have	  a	  profound	  effect	  on	  the	  country’s	  participation	  in	  a	  foreign	  conflict	  (Ostrom	  and	  Job	  1986,	  James	  and	  Oneal	  1991).	  	  The	  president	  is	  believed	  to	  make	  foreign	  policy	  decisions	  based	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  country’s	  involvement	  abroad	  will	  direct	  people’s	  attention	  from	  domestic	  troubles	  and	  force	  them	  to	  rally	  around	  the	  leader	  in	  the	  face	  of	  a	  potential	  foreign	  danger.	  Many	  scholars	  focus	  on	  the	  use	  of	  this	  tactic	  in	  the	  US	  prior	  to	  elections	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to	  give	  the	  current	  president’s	  popularity	  a	  boost	  (Polsby	  1964,	  Waltz	  1967,	  Mueller	  1973,	  Brody	  1984).	  	  The	  main	  focus	  of	  this	  broader	  literature	  has	  been	  the	  US	  and	  other	  democratic	  regimes,	  because	  it	  is	  in	  democracies	  that	  public	  opinion	  is	  thought	  to	  matter	  the	  most.	  Unlike	  authoritarian	  regimes,	  democracies	  have	  very	  strict	  limitations	  on	  the	  power	  of	  the	  state,	  checked	  by	  and	  dispersed	  among	  a	  number	  of	  institutions.	  Politicians	  thus	  go	  through	  cycles	  of	  elections,	  in	  which	  poor	  performance	  may	  and	  does	  eventually	  result	  in	  an	  election	  defeat.	  Thus,	  public	  opinion	  plays	  a	  great	  role	  in	  such	  regimes,	  serving	  as	  a	  litmus	  test	  of	  public	  attitudes	  and	  consequently	  as	  an	  indication	  of	  the	  future	  career	  of	  politicians.	  Authoritarian	  governments	  differ	  greatly	  from	  liberal	  democratic	  ones.	  The	  fact	  that	  such	  states	  have	  fewer	  limitations	  on	  the	  regime’s	  power	  and	  less	  rigorous	  control	  exercised	  by	  various	  institutions	  has	  meant	  that	  limited	  attention	  has	  been	  paid	  to	  authoritarian	  regimes	  in	  connection	  to	  the	  rally	  round	  the	  flag	  effect.	  Earlier	  studies	  emphasized	  that	  authoritarian	  governments	  are	  not	  hesitant	  to	  use	  power	  to	  deal	  with	  domestic	  discontent	  (Gurr	  1988,	  Russett	  and	  Barzilai	  1990).	  But	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  possess	  hypothetically	  the	  ability	  to	  use	  coercive	  means	  against	  their	  populations	  that	  democracies	  lack,	  rarely	  do	  they	  resort	  to	  this	  method.	  Even	  most	  non-­‐democratic	  regimes	  care	  to	  some	  degree	  about	  public	  opinion	  and	  thus	  are	  reluctant	  to	  employ	  such	  radical	  means.	  As	  Levy	  and	  Vakili	  (1992)	  note,	  “[E]ven	  authoritarian	  regimes	  must	  maintain	  a	  minimal	  level	  of	  public	  acceptance	  or	  at	  least	  apathy	  towards	  their	  policies	  and	  their	  position	  of	  political	  authority.”	  They	  add	  that	  such	  regimes	  are	  tempted	  to	  use	  patriotic	  sentiment	  of	  the	  population	  to	  legitimize	  the	  government’s	  actions,	  even	  more	  so	  in	  unfavorable	  economic	  circumstances.	  “The	  construction	  of	  an	  external	  threat	  and	  pursuit	  of	  a	  belligerent	  foreign	  policy	  against	  that	  threat	  is	  one	  means	  adopted	  by	  political	  elites	  for	  this	  purpose,	  though	  its	  success	  is	  by	  no	  means	  assured,”	  write	  Levy	  and	  Vakili.	  	  While	  nationalistic	  sentiment	  remains	  a	  strong	  tool	  for	  making	  the	  population	  rally	  in	  authoritarian	  states,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  only	  one.	  Hence,	  Bunce	  and	  Wolchik	  (2011)	  note	  that	  another	  source	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of	  rally	  effects	  in	  authoritarian	  regimes	  could	  be	  US	  pressure.	  To	  illustrate	  that,	  they	  cite	  the	  population’s	  overwhelming	  support	  for	  Slobodan	  Milosevic	  immediately	  after	  NATO	  bombings	  of	  Serbia	  in	  1999.	  Grauvogel	  and	  von	  Soerst	  (2013)	  also	  look	  at	  undemocratic	  countries	  and	  argue	  that	  broad	  (as	  opposed	  to	  targeted)	  sanctions	  imposed	  on	  authoritarian	  regimes	  may	  serve	  as	  a	  potential	  (though	  unwilling)	  origin	  of	  the	  rally-­‐round-­‐the-­‐flag	  effect	  in	  these	  countries.	  For	  this	  to	  happen,	  the	  authoritarian	  regime	  in	  question	  must	  enjoy	  “strong	  claims	  to	  legitimacy	  and	  have	  only	  limited	  linkages	  to	  the	  sanction	  sender.”	  Iran	  and	  Cuba	  may	  serve	  as	  two	  vivid	  examples	  of	  how	  US-­‐led	  comprehensive	  sanctions	  instead	  of	  weakening	  and	  undermining	  the	  regime	  strengthened	  it	  and	  caused	  extensive	  rally-­‐round-­‐the-­‐flag	  effect	  instances	  (Amuzegar	  1997,	  Schreiber	  1973).	  In	  case	  of	  a	  strong	  authoritarian	  leader	  who	  enjoys	  high	  levels	  of	  support,	  sanctions	  are	  “explained”	  to	  the	  population	  as	  an	  attack	  on	  the	  entire	  society,	  which	  further	  reinforces	  support	  for	  the	  authoritarian	  leader.	   Since	  the	  majority	  of	  existing	  literature	  has	  looked	  at	  how	  the	  rally-­‐round-­‐the-­‐flag	  effect	  has	  unfolded	  in	  the	  US	  and	  left	  instances	  of	  this	  phenomenon	  in	  other	  countries	  considerably	  less	  explored,	  my	  research	  is	  likely	  to	  have	  far-­‐ranging	  implications	  for	  politicians,	  observers,	  and	  scholars	  of	  both	  Russian	  politics	  and	  international	  relations.	  For	  international	  decision-­‐makers,	  this	  thesis	  will	  be	  helpful	  in	  understanding	  and	  predicting	  public	  opinion	  and	  reaction	  to	  an	  international	  crisis	  in	  competitive	  authoritarian	  regimes	  in	  general,	  and	  Russia	  in	  particular.	  It	  also	  helps	  us	  understand	  when	  such	  regimes	  might	  instigate	  international	  conflicts	  in	  order	  to	  boost	  the	  leader’s	  popularity	  domestically.	  Not	  just	  any	  international	  conflict	  will	  lead	  to	  a	  similarly	  strong	  rallying	  phenomenon.	  We	  need	  to	  know	  what	  elements	  and	  attributes	  of	  a	  conflict	  are	  essential	  for	  generating	  a	  powerful	  rallying	  effect	  before	  we	  can	  predict	  when	  an	  authoritarian	  leader	  may	  choose	  a	  conflict	  to	  pump	  up	  her/his	  ratings.	  Further,	  this	  research	  will	  pinpoint	  the	  arguments	  made	  by	  the	  regime	  that	  caused	  an	  upsurge	  of	  public	  approval.	  Coupled	  with	  the	  vitally	  critical	  components	  (i.e.	  historical	  grievances	  of	  the	  population	  and	  feelings	  of	  patriotism),	  understanding	  which	  people	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  rally	  allows	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researchers	  to	  predict	  what	  groups	  of	  citizens	  the	  ruling	  regime	  will	  be	  likely	  to	  focus	  on	  when	  “selling”	  the	  crisis	  to	  the	  population.	  	  For	  specialists	  in	  Russian	  politics,	  my	  research	  identifies	  areas	  where	  opposition	  forces	  can	  attempt	  to	  reverse	  recently	  inflated	  pro-­‐regime	  sentiment	  by	  exposing	  the	  fault	  lines	  along	  which	  the	  rally-­‐round-­‐the-­‐flag	  effect	  operates.	  The	  insight	  into	  who	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  rally	  might	  allow	  oppositional	  groups	  and	  parties	  to	  deploy	  this	  knowledge	  to	  undermine	  or	  contest	  the	  regime.	  By	  understanding	  what	  arguments	  are	  most	  persuasive	  to	  rallying	  individuals,	  the	  opposition	  can	  attempt	  to	  undermine	  these	  arguments	  and	  challenge	  the	  rationale	  for	  getting	  involved	  in	  the	  international	  crisis	  as	  well	  as	  confront	  the	  view	  that	  the	  West	  constitutes	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  nation.	  Being	  aware	  of	  which	  of	  the	  regime’s	  lines	  of	  reasoning	  proved	  to	  be	  the	  most	  effective	  might	  help	  opposition	  groups	  to	  counter	  these	  facts	  and	  present	  the	  population	  with	  alternative	  explanations	  and	  evidence.	  	  For	  Western	  politicians,	  the	  research	  shows	  how	  some	  of	  their	  well-­‐intended	  policies,3	  including	  those	  to	  confront	  international	  aggression,	  might	  instead	  strengthen	  the	  regime	  in	  the	  competitive	  authoritarian	  state	  like	  Russia.	  While	  this	  thesis	  does	  not	  provide	  specific	  evidence	  that	  non-­‐confrontational	  and	  behind-­‐the-­‐scenes	  diplomacy	  would	  constitute	  a	  better	  solution,	  it	  at	  least	  highlights	  some	  unintended	  consequences	  of	  well-­‐meaning	  policies.	  Finally,	  the	  thesis	  contributes	  to	  the	  existing	  body	  of	  academic	  literature	  on	  the	  rally-­‐round-­‐the-­‐flag	  effect	  and	  public	  opinion	  by	  examining	  an	  area	  that	  has	  yet	  to	  be	  explored.	  By	  looking	  at	  the	  case	  of	  Russia,	  I	  broaden	  the	  theory	  from	  its	  initial	  focus	  on	  the	  US	  and	  democracies	  to	  a	  broad	  theory	  that	  can	  be	  applied	  across	  numerous	  countries	  and	  regions.	  I	  aim	  to	  compliment	  the	  literature	  on	  Eastern	  Europe	  and	  be	  instrumental	  in	  finding	  variables	  that	  could	  be	  tested	  comparatively.	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  See	  Kelley	  2012	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  LITERATURE	  REVIEW	   	  I	  begin,	  in	  this	  section,	  by	  reviewing	  the	  existing	  literature	  on	  the	  rally-­‐round-­‐the-­‐flag	  phenomenon.	  I	  examine	  the	  various	  variables	  that	  have	  been	  tested	  to	  determine	  who	  rallies	  and	  who	  doesn’t.	  I	  evaluate	  the	  likelihood	  of	  obtaining	  similar	  results	  in	  Russia	  despite	  the	  considerable	  social	  and	  political	  differences	  between	  the	  US	  and	  Russia.	  I	  then	  proceed	  by	  generating	  a	  number	  of	  hypotheses	  concerning	  the	  personalities	  of	  those	  individuals	  who	  are	  likely	  to	  rally	  around	  the	  flag	  based	  on	  the	  existing	  literature,	  bearing	  in	  mind	  Russia-­‐specific	  particularities,	  and	  test	  my	  hypotheses.	  The	  results	  will	  be	  instrumental	  in	  understanding	  whether	  my	  hypotheses	  can	  be	  applied	  comparatively.	  My	  paper	  focuses	  on	  individuals	  who	  rally	  around	  the	  flag,	  in	  other	  words,	  the	  people	  whose	  change	  of	  mind	  about	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  country	  (from	  negative	  to	  positive)	  coincided	  with	  the	  country’s	  involvement	  in	  an	  international	  crisis.	  Here	  it	  is	  important	  to	  differentiate	  between	  those	  who	  rally	  and	  simple	  regime	  supporters:	  while	  the	  former	  group	  of	  people	  switched	  camps	  and	  present	  interest	  for	  my	  research,	  the	  latter	  technically	  cannot	  “rally”	  since	  their	  opinion	  about	  the	  leader	  had	  been	  formed	  before	  the	  crisis	  and	  didn’t	  change	  for	  the	  better.	  My	  research	  thus	  revolves	  around	  those	  who	  had	  initially	  opposed	  the	  leader,	  but	  who	  changed	  their	  opinion	  after	  an	  international	  crisis.	  	  The	  literature	  on	  the	  rally-­‐round-­‐the-­‐flag	  effect	  follows	  two	  distinct	  paths	  when	  analyzing	  the	  phenomenon:	  scholars	  look	  at	  either	  the	  characteristics	  of	  people	  who	  rally	  or	  at	  the	  characteristics	  of	  the	  event	  that	  triggered	  the	  rally	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  In	  this	  paper	  I	  will	  be	  focusing	  solely	  on	  the	  characteristics	  of	  rallying	  individuals	  since	  I	  will	  be	  analyzing	  one	  event	  and	  thus	  have	  no	  variance	  of	  international	  issue.	  However,	  in	  this	  section	  I	  will,	  in	  addition	  to	  describing	  the	  existing	  theory	  on	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individuals’	  characteristics,	  also	  talk	  about	  the	  research	  that	  defines	  what	  crises	  typify	  rallying	  events	  to	  allow	  for	  a	  fuller	  understanding	  of	  the	  phenomenon	  and	  the	  literature	  that	  has	  been	  studying	  it.	  	  	   Among	  the	  scholars	  who	  analyzed	  the	  characteristics	  of	  rallying	  individuals,	  Edwards	  and	  Swenson	  (1997)	  argue	  that	  the	  people	  that	  ended	  up	  rallying	  were	  inclined	  to	  support	  the	  president	  and	  her/his	  actions	  from	  the	  start.	  Additionally,	  they	  found	  that	  “party	  identification,	  evaluations	  of	  the	  president’s	  leadership	  and	  support	  for	  her/his	  economic	  and	  foreign	  policies”	  largely	  determine	  who	  will	  rally.	  Among	  other	  characteristics,	  they	  look	  at	  the	  age	  of	  respondents	  and	  find	  that	  younger	  people	  (18-­‐29	  and	  30-­‐44)	  were	  unlikely	  to	  rally:	  the	  percentage	  of	  those	  who	  changed	  their	  opinion	  about	  the	  president	  decreased	  slightly	  after	  the	  rally	  event.	  Quite	  on	  the	  contrary,	  they	  observed	  that	  older	  people	  (45-­‐64	  and	  older)	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  rally	  –	  the	  percentage	  of	  older	  individuals	  who	  changed	  their	  minds	  about	  the	  country’s	  leader	  increased,	  though	  insignificantly,	  after	  the	  crisis.	  Further,	  Edwards	  and	  Swenson	  add	  that	  media	  had	  a	  certain	  effect	  by	  “reinforcing”	  the	  potentially	  already	  positive	  view	  of	  the	  president	  that	  people	  had.	  Thus,	  those	  who	  paid	  attention	  to	  the	  news	  and	  approved	  of	  the	  way	  the	  president	  was	  dealing	  with	  the	  international	  crisis,	  were	  much	  more	  likely	  to	  rally	  than	  those	  who	  were	  not	  exposed	  to	  the	  media.	  Furthermore,	  Iyengar	  (1991)	  found	  that	  the	  media,	  by	  airing	  news	  about	  the	  international	  crisis	  and	  the	  president’s	  actions	  in	  response	  to	  this	  crisis,	  draw	  people’s	  attention	  to	  the	  event	  and	  artificially	  boost	  its	  importance	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  public.	  Greater	  attention	  may	  thus	  lead	  to	  an	  improved	  view	  of	  the	  president:	  "The	  themes	  and	  issues	  that	  are	  repeated	  in	  television	  news	  coverage	  become	  the	  priorities	  of	  viewers.	  Issues	  and	  events	  highlighted	  by	  television	  news	  become	  especially	  influential	  as	  criteria	  for	  evaluating	  public	  officials."	  Close	  attention	  to	  the	  news	  broadcast	  by	  state	  media	  might	  lead	  to	  a	  change	  in	  opinion	  (from	  disapproval	  to	  support)	  about	  the	  president.	  	  	   Baum	  (2002),	  somewhat	  similarly	  to	  Edwards	  and	  Swenson,	  argues	  that	  what	  tilts	  the	  balance	  of	  an	  individual’s	  opinion	  is	  the	  definiteness	  of	  this	  opinion.	  In	  other	  words,	  those	  who	  don’t	  outright	  oppose	  the	  president,	  but	  are	  rather	  closer	  to	  being	  undecided,	  will	  be	  more	  eager	  to	  change	  their	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opinion	  about	  the	  president	  in	  response	  to	  an	  international	  crisis.	  He	  adds	  that	  the	  population’s	  focus	  on	  foreign	  affairs	  at	  the	  time	  of	  crisis	  will	  also	  influence	  the	  scale	  of	  the	  rally-­‐round-­‐the-­‐flag	  effect:	  the	  less	  attention	  the	  population	  pays	  to	  the	  country’s	  foreign	  affairs	  immediately	  prior	  to	  when	  the	  conflict	  occurs,	  the	  larger	  the	  rally	  effect	  will	  be.	  Zaller	  (1992)	  suggested	  that	  a	  person’s	  decision	  to	  rally	  is	  contingent	  on	  his	  or	  her	  level	  of	  “political	  awareness	  or	  sophistication”.	  Baum	  applies	  Zaller’s	  model	  and	  finds	  that	  the	  individuals	  with	  extremely	  low	  levels	  of	  political	  awareness	  will	  remain	  highly	  uninterested	  in	  international	  affairs	  and	  their	  opinions	  will	  hardly	  change	  even	  at	  the	  time	  of	  a	  serious	  international	  crisis.	  The	  opinions	  of	  the	  extremely	  politically	  aware	  will	  also	  likely	  remain	  unchanged,	  since	  their	  opinions	  have	  been	  long	  since	  formed	  and	  they	  tend	  to	  not	  pay	  attention	  to	  new	  political	  information.	  This,	  based	  on	  Zaller’s	  model,	  leaves	  us	  with	  the	  moderately	  aware	  individuals,	  who	  constitute	  the	  majority	  of	  all	  those	  who	  rally	  round	  the	  flag.	  In	  order	  to	  measure	  an	  individual’s	  political	  awareness	  Baum	  uses	  levels	  of	  education.	  	   Feinstein	  (2010)	  claims	  that	  the	  rally-­‐round-­‐the-­‐flag	  effect	  occurs	  when	  “established	  nationalistic	  frameworks	  become	  more	  salient,	  and	  individual	  citizens	  experience	  widespread	  feelings	  of	  nationalist	  pride,	  confidence	  in	  the	  government,	  and	  hope	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  outcomes	  of	  war”.	  He	  thus	  shifts	  the	  emphasis	  on	  the	  people’s	  positive	  feelings	  toward	  the	  country’s	  authorities	  and	  argues	  that	  a	  nation-­‐wide	  rally	  phenomenon	  occurs	  when	  individuals	  feel	  proud	  of	  and	  confident	  in	  the	  country’s	  leader	  and	  her/his	  policy	  decisions.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  my	  research	  this	  means	  that	  I	  can	  expect	  those	  individuals	  who	  expressed	  more	  nationalist	  sentiment	  and	  demonstrated	  pride	  of	  Russia’s	  actions	  to	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  rally	  round	  the	  flag.	  I	  will	  consequently	  expect	  that	  the	  individuals	  who	  didn’t	  demonstrate	  similar	  sentiment	  will	  be	  less	  likely	  to	  change	  their	  minds	  about	  Russia’s	  president	  and	  rally.	  	  	   Horowitz	  and	  Levendusky	  (2012)	  find	  that	  what	  matters	  in	  predicting	  a	  leader’s	  support	  among	  the	  population	  is	  the	  rationale	  the	  president	  uses	  to	  explain	  why	  he	  backed	  down	  in	  an	  international	  conflict	  and	  the	  reaction	  of	  the	  elites	  to	  this	  decision.	  Thus,	  those	  who	  think	  backing	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down	  in	  the	  conflict	  was	  the	  right	  thing	  to	  do	  or	  that	  the	  president’s	  reaction	  was	  legitimate	  and	  necessary,	  will	  see	  him	  as	  a	  competent	  and	  well-­‐informed	  leader.	  I	  believe	  that	  the	  population’s	  reactions	  might	  take	  a	  similar	  path	  when	  the	  president	  attempts	  to	  explain	  getting	  involved	  in	  an	  international	  crisis,	  not	  only	  backing	  down	  in	  one.	  I	  suggest	  that	  those	  individuals	  who	  believe	  that	  the	  reasons	  to	  get	  involved	  in	  an	  international	  crisis	  were	  legitimate	  and	  the	  president	  did	  the	  right	  thing	  will	  rally.	  Similarly,	  those	  who	  thought	  the	  rationale	  behind	  getting	  involved	  in	  a	  crisis	  was	  not	  legitimate	  and	  the	  president	  made	  a	  mistake	  will	  be	  unlikely	  to	  rally.	  	  	   Parker	  (1995)	  notes	  that	  in	  the	  course	  of	  an	  international	  conflict	  the	  US	  was	  involved	  in,	  people	  were	  more	  inclined	  to	  disregard	  economic	  difficulties	  and	  assess	  their	  economic	  situation	  more	  favorably	  than	  they	  would	  have	  done	  at	  a	  time	  of	  international	  calm.	  She	  notes	  that	  in	  the	  face	  of	  an	  international	  conflict	  individuals	  tend	  to	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  put	  aside	  their	  economic	  grievances	  and	  unite,	  rallying	  round	  the	  flag.	  Thus,	  both	  those	  who	  subjectively	  assessed	  their	  economic	  situation	  as	  favorable	  as	  well	  as	  those	  who	  saw	  it	  as	  unfavorable	  or	  deteriorating,	  rallied.	  However,	  this	  feeble	  agreement	  and	  willingness	  to	  ignore	  economic	  difficulties	  persists	  solely	  during	  the	  time	  of	  the	  crisis.	  Soon	  after,	  Parker	  argues,	  evaluations	  of	  economic	  conditions	  go	  back	  to	  the	  pre-­‐conflict	  level.	  	  Finally,	  when	  considering	  gender,	  Conover	  (1988),	  Gilens	  (1988),	  Fite,	  Genesi,	  and	  Wilcox	  (1990),	  and	  Conover	  and	  Sapiro	  (1993)	  note	  that	  compared	  to	  men,	  women	  demonstrate	  more	  concern	  about	  international	  crises.	  Page	  and	  Shapiro	  (1992)	  and	  Mueller	  (1973,	  1994)	  similarly	  argue	  that	  in	  most	  cases	  of	  an	  international	  conflict	  that	  involves	  the	  use	  of	  force,	  women	  would	  be	  more	  opposed	  to	  military	  action	  than	  men.	  Turning	  to	  the	  literature	  that	  focuses	  on	  event	  characteristics,	  Lai	  and	  Reiter	  (2005)	  put	  forward	  the	  idea	  that	  rallies	  happen	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  direct	  threat	  to	  national	  wellbeing.	  Kam	  and	  Ramos	  (2008)	  support	  this	  belief	  and	  argue	  that	  during	  a	  short	  period	  of	  time	  the	  country’s	  involvement	  in	  an	  international	  crisis	  will	  make	  voters	  see	  the	  president	  as	  a	  national	  leader	  acting	  in	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the	  best	  interests	  of	  the	  nation.	  The	  crisis	  thus	  will	  trigger	  the	  national	  feelings	  of	  some	  individuals,	  allowing	  the	  president	  to	  enjoy	  a	  tentative	  rise	  in	  popularity.	  	  	  Brody	  (1991)	  argues	  that	  a	  rally	  happens	  when	  opposition	  leaders	  “refrain	  from	  comment”	  or	  support	  the	  president	  and	  his	  actions.	  The	  media	  then	  magnifies	  the	  opposition	  reaction,	  and	  the	  opposition	  approval	  (or	  lack	  of	  criticism)	  leads	  the	  public	  to	  think	  that	  the	  president	  is	  doing	  her/his	  job	  well.	  Gaines	  et	  al.	  (2007),	  Jacobs	  and	  Page	  (2005)	  and	  Zaller	  (1992)	  similarly	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  the	  balanced	  elite	  reaction	  that	  shapes	  public	  opinion,	  especially	  in	  a	  situation	  of	  an	  international	  conflict.	  When	  the	  elite	  fails	  to	  criticize	  the	  president	  and	  her/his	  actions,	  it	  becomes	  a	  signal	  for	  those	  who	  had	  previously	  opposed	  him	  that	  she/he	  is	  doing	  the	  right	  thing	  (Groeling	  and	  Baum	  2008).	  	  In	  the	  next	  section	  I	  will	  look	  at	  the	  levels	  of	  media	  importance	  in	  the	  studies	  of	  the	  rally-­‐round-­‐the	  flag	  effect	  and	  attempt	  to	  evaluate	  its	  significance	  for	  the	  Russian	  case	  of	  the	  rallying	  phenomenon.	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   THE	  MEDIA	  EFFECT	  	   Despite	  their	  different	  foci,	  the	  two	  paths	  of	  rally-­‐round-­‐the-­‐flag	  research	  have	  one	  characteristic	  in	  common;	  they	  both	  emphasize	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  media.	  In	  his	  analysis	  of	  the	  likelihood	  of	  rally	  events,	  Brody	  (1991)	  stated	  that	  people’s	  personal	  opinions	  formed	  prior	  to	  the	  event	  might	  not	  be	  the	  only	  source	  of	  judgment.	  	  The	  media	  coverage	  of	  the	  rally	  event	  that	  individuals	  are	  exposed	  to	  on	  TV	  can	  contribute	  to	  forming	  (or	  changing)	  their	  opinion	  of	  this	  event.	  The	  international	  crisis	  that	  triggers	  the	  rally	  phenomenon,	  Brody	  argues,	  usually	  happens	  so	  abruptly	  and	  the	  specific	  details	  about	  the	  crisis	  are	  available	  to	  so	  few	  state	  officials	  that	  the	  only	  information	  is	  coming	  from	  the	  media	  and	  the	  elites.	  The	  latter,	  however,	  (even	  regime	  opponents)	  at	  first	  abstain	  from	  hurried	  judgments	  until	  more	  information	  is	  available.	  As	  a	  result,	  either	  a	  lack	  of	  overt	  criticism	  or	  weak	  support	  of	  the	  country’s	  leader	  is	  being	  broadcast	  on	  TV	  and	  ultimately	  leads	  to	  a	  positive	  balance	  of	  elite	  commentary	  that	  is	  available	  for	  the	  public.	  	  Similarly	  to	  Brody’s	  idea,	  Iyengar,	  Peters,	  and	  Kinder	  (1982)	  talked	  about	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  media	  in	  forming	  public	  opinion.	  “The	  standards	  people	  used	  in	  evaluating	  the	  president,	  what	  they	  felt	  was	  important	  in	  his	  job	  performance,	  seemed	  to	  be	  influenced	  by	  the	  news	  they	  watched	  on	  television,”	  they	  noted.	  A	  few	  years	  later,	  in	  his	  book	  “Is	  Anyone	  Responsible?”	  Iyengar	  developed	  this	  idea,	  taking	  it	  a	  little	  further.	  He	  argued	  that	  television	  essentially	  sets	  the	  political	  agenda	  since	  “events	  highlighted	  by	  television	  news	  become	  especially	  influential	  as	  criteria	  for	  evaluating	  public	  officials	  and	  choosing	  between	  political	  candidates.	  There	  is	  also	  evidence	  that	  television	  news	  persuades	  viewers	  to	  alter	  their	  opinions.”	  Paired	  with	  Brody’s	  claim	  that	  during	  international	  crises	  the	  public	  is	  forced	  to	  turn	  to	  the	  generally	  sympathetic-­‐to-­‐the-­‐president	  media	  for	  any	  information	  on	  the	  crisis,	  Iyengar’s	  argument	  suggests	  that	  those	  who	  pay	  close	  attention	  to	  the	  media	  during	  a	  crisis	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will	  rally.	  What’s	  more,	  Baum	  and	  Groeling	  (2004)	  claimed	  that	  a	  typical	  viewer	  lacks	  information	  to	  reach	  a	  decision	  of	  whether	  to	  support	  or	  oppose	  her/his	  president’s	  behavior.	  “Instead	  they	  rely	  on	  information	  shortcuts,	  or	  heuristic	  clues,	  most	  notably	  the	  opinions	  of	  trusted	  political	  elites,	  primarily	  as	  reflected	  in	  the	  media.”	  Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  Brody’s	  analyses	  focused	  on	  the	  likelihood	  of	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  rally	  event	  and	  didn’t	  look	  at	  the	  characteristics	  of	  rallying	  individuals,	  Edwards	  and	  Swenson	  (1997)	  applied	  his	  theory	  to	  an	  individual	  level.	  In	  the	  panel	  data	  analysis	  they	  conducted,	  they	  looked	  at	  the	  crisis	  in	  Iraq	  in	  1993	  and	  hypothesized	  that	  those	  who	  paid	  the	  closest	  attention	  to	  the	  media	  should	  have	  been	  most	  likely	  to	  rally	  around	  President	  Clinton	  since	  the	  media	  commentary	  of	  the	  crisis	  was	  extremely	  positive.	  They	  found,	  however,	  that	  attention	  to	  the	  media	  in	  itself	  did	  not	  characterize	  those	  who	  rallied.	  Instead,	  they	  noted	  that	  “exposure	  to	  the	  media	  substantially	  increase[d]	  the	  probability	  that	  those	  with	  positive	  evaluations	  of	  the	  president's	  handling	  of	  foreign	  policy	  will	  rally.”	  	  Drawing	  on	  the	  research	  of	  Brody,	  Iyengar,	  Baum	  and	  Groeling,	  I	  also	  turn	  my	  attention	  to	  importance	  of	  the	  media.	  However,	  despite	  its	  undeniable	  significance,	  I	  expect	  to	  find	  that	  close	  attention	  to	  the	  media	  is	  not	  in	  itself	  enough	  to	  be	  a	  signal	  that	  an	  individual	  will	  rally	  round	  the	  flag.	  This	  expectation	  is	  based	  on	  the	  lack	  of	  certainty	  that	  attention	  to	  the	  media	  equals	  attention	  to	  political	  news.	  I	  thus	  expect	  that	  when	  paired	  with	  acute	  interest	  in	  politics,	  attention	  to	  the	  media	  may	  lead	  to	  rallying	  effects.	  	  In	  the	  next	  section,	  I	  will	  attempt	  to	  evaluate	  the	  applicability	  of	  the	  results	  presented	  in	  the	  US-­‐focused	  literature	  to	  the	  Russian	  case.	  I	  will	  analyze	  the	  differences	  between	  the	  two	  regimes	  that	  I	  expect	  to	  affect	  my	  results.	  I	  will	  then	  proceed	  to	  generating	  a	  number	  of	  hypotheses.	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  APPLICABILITY	  OF	  PREEXISTING	  THEORY	  TO	  RUSSIA	  	   Although	  I	  have	  no	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  most	  of	  the	  results	  presented	  in	  the	  previous	  research	  of	  the	  rally-­‐round-­‐the-­‐flag	  effect	  will	  not	  hold	  in	  the	  Russian	  case,	  some	  might	  not	  work	  exactly	  in	  the	  same	  way	  in	  an	  environment	  that	  differs	  greatly	  from	  the	  political	  climate	  of	  a	  liberal	  democracy	  that	  is	  the	  US.	  Thus,	  I	  believe	  that	  due	  to	  the	  specifics	  of	  the	  Russian	  case,	  the	  relative	  temporal	  proximity	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  and	  major	  historical	  grievances,	  the	  correlation	  between	  age	  and	  the	  likelihood	  of	  rallying	  will	  be	  much	  higher	  in	  the	  Russian	  case	  than	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  US.	  Furthermore,	  I	  believe	  there	  might	  be	  differences	  in	  what	  role	  individual	  economic	  difficulties	  played	  in	  determining	  who	  rallied	  in	  Russia.	  While	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  believe	  the	  link	  between	  the	  population’s	  economic	  grievances	  and	  presidential	  popularity	  will	  differ	  greatly	  in	  Russia	  from	  that	  in	  the	  US,	  the	  relative	  tolerance	  of	  individuals	  to	  economic	  hardships	  in	  Russia	  might	  be	  lower,	  thus	  changing	  the	  weight	  that	  the	  economic	  situation	  plays	  in	  the	  country.	  In	  this	  section	  I	  will	  look	  into	  the	  Russia-­‐specific	  considerations	  that	  might	  affect	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  rallying	  effect	  in	  the	  country	  and	  analyze	  why	  I	  believe	  they	  might	  develop	  differently	  in	  the	  Russian	  context.	  	  	   The	  research	  conducted	  by	  Edwards	  and	  Swenson	  (1997)	  shows	  a	  very	  small	  correlation	  between	  age	  and	  the	  probability	  of	  rallying.	  Their	  work	  demonstrates	  that	  people	  over	  45	  tend	  to	  be	  just	  a	  little	  more	  likely	  to	  rally	  round	  the	  flag	  than	  younger	  people.	  In	  Russia,	  however,	  I	  expect	  the	  correlation	  between	  age	  and	  likelihood	  of	  rallying	  to	  be	  much	  higher	  and	  presume	  that	  older	  people	  will	  be	  much	  more	  likely	  to	  rally	  that	  younger	  people.	  For	  older	  generations,	  the	  Cold	  War	  and	  the	  power	  struggle	  between	  the	  USSR	  and	  the	  US	  is	  a	  much	  more	  salient	  event	  than	  for	  the	  younger	  generation—a	  great	  number	  of	  older	  individuals	  not	  only	  remember	  the	  circumstances	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  well,	  but	  also	  preserved	  a	  suspicious	  attitude	  towards	  the	  US.	  For	  them,	  the	  patriotic	  feelings	  that	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the	  regime	  has	  actively	  tried	  to	  appeal	  to	  during	  the	  Ukrainian	  crisis	  likely	  resonate	  more	  strongly	  than	  with	  younger	  generations.	  Moreover,	  a	  great	  number	  of	  these	  people	  continue	  to	  perceive	  Crimea	  as	  part	  of	  the	  USSR;	  for	  them,	  Putin’s	  controversial	  referendum	  and	  annexation	  of	  the	  territory	  was	  a	  clear	  example	  of	  historical	  justice	  and	  not	  violation	  of	  international	  law.	  I	  thus	  expect	  that	  older	  people	  will	  be	  significantly	  more	  likely	  to	  rally	  round	  the	  Russian	  flag,	  and	  the	  correlation	  between	  age	  and	  likelihood	  of	  rallying	  will	  be	  much	  more	  prominent	  and	  conspicuous	  than	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  US.	  	  Furthermore,	  I	  expect	  that	  individuals’	  economic	  situation	  and	  economic	  grievances	  in	  particular	  might	  have	  a	  different	  weight	  in	  determining	  who	  will	  rally	  in	  Russia.	  In	  the	  US-­‐focused	  literature,	  there	  has	  long	  been	  a	  strong	  link	  between	  presidential	  popularity	  and	  the	  economy.	  Mueller	  (1970)	  emphasized	  the	  effect	  that	  the	  country’s	  economy	  has	  on	  the	  levels	  of	  presidential	  approval,	  whereby	  a	  sinking	  economy	  leads	  to	  dipping	  presidential	  popularity.	  Similarly,	  numerous	  subsequent	  studies	  found	  a	  strong	  economic	  influence	  on	  presidential	  approval	  ratings	  (Stimson	  1976,	  Monroe	  1978,	  MacKuen	  1983,	  Kernell	  1978).	  However,	  as	  Parker	  (1995)	  argues	  in	  her	  research,	  financial	  grievances	  of	  the	  population	  can	  be	  put	  aside	  and	  not	  affect	  a	  leader’s	  popularity	  during	  a	  rally	  event.	  She	  notes	  that	  international	  crises	  cause	  the	  US	  population	  to	  put	  aside	  their	  economic	  struggles	  and	  unite	  (even	  if	  only	  for	  a	  short	  period	  of	  time)	  around	  the	  president.	  Thus,	  despite	  the	  strong	  link	  between	  a	  country’s	  economy	  and	  presidential	  approval	  ratings,	  rally	  events	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  “overpower”	  the	  negative	  consequences	  of	  falling	  economy	  and	  bring	  a	  population	  together.	  	  In	  Russia,	  similarly	  to	  the	  US-­‐focused	  literature,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  trace	  the	  direct	  correlation	  between	  presidential	  popularity	  and	  the	  country’s	  economic	  situation.	  In	  2005,	  2008/2009	  and	  2013	  Putin’s	  popularity	  in	  Russia	  markedly	  decreased;4	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  these	  three	  time	  periods	  mark	  significant	  drops	  in	  the	  country’s	  economic	  growth.5	  Hence,	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  rallying	  event,	  Russia	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  http://www.forbes.com/sites/markadomanis/2013/06/11/vladimir-­‐putins-­‐approval-­‐rating-­‐isnt-­‐actually-­‐declining/	  	  	  5http://intermarketandmore.finanza.com/files/2014/10/russian_gdp_and_oil_price.jpg%20http://intermarketandmore.finanza.com/files/2014/10/russian_gdp_and_oil_price.jpg	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and	  the	  US	  seem	  to	  be	  quite	  similar	  as	  regards	  the	  relationship	  of	  presidential	  support	  by	  the	  population	  and	  the	  state	  of	  the	  economy.	  	  However,	  the	  Russian	  economic	  environment	  is	  not	  identical	  to	  that	  of	  the	  US.	  In	  2013,	  about	  15%	  of	  Americans	  were	  reported	  to	  live	  below	  the	  poverty	  line.6	  Another	  35%	  of	  the	  country’s	  population	  was	  said	  to	  be	  struggling	  and	  barely	  making	  it	  just	  above	  the	  poverty	  line.	  And	  while	  it	  is	  an	  impressively	  shocking	  figure,	  the	  situation	  in	  Russia	  is	  even	  more	  dismaying.	  In	  Russia	  in	  2013,	  the	  number	  of	  people	  who	  live	  below	  or	  just	  above	  the	  poverty	  line	  equaled	  about	  68%.7	  The	  presented	  numbers	  signify	  that	  many	  more	  individuals	  in	  Russia	  are	  forced	  to	  care	  about	  the	  smallest	  changes	  in	  their	  economic	  situation	  than	  in	  the	  US	  and	  Russians	  are	  much	  more	  likely	  to	  notice	  the	  slightest	  decline	  in	  their	  income	  level.	  Thus,	  while	  I	  believe	  that	  Russians,	  just	  like	  Americans,	  will	  be	  willing	  to	  put	  their	  economic	  grievances	  aside	  during	  an	  international	  crisis,	  they	  might	  be	  more	  susceptible	  to	  negative	  changes	  in	  the	  country’s	  economy	  and	  individuals’	  financial	  situations	  than	  Americans.	  This	  might	  mean	  that	  despite	  their	  willingness	  to	  put	  aside	  financial	  grievances	  during	  an	  international	  crisis	  period	  and	  rally,	  Russia’s	  population	  might	  be	  more	  sensitive	  to	  the	  changes	  in	  the	  economy	  and	  could	  be	  quicker	  to	  switch	  back	  to	  not	  approving	  (or	  disapproving)	  the	  president	  if	  their	  economic	  situation	  doesn’t	  improve.	  	  In	  the	  next	  section	  I	  lay	  out	  my	  hypotheses.	  And	  though	  they	  are	  based	  on	  the	  US-­‐focused	  research,	  I	  will	  take	  into	  account	  my	  assumptions	  (described	  above)	  about	  the	  dissimilarity	  of	  Russia’s	  political	  and	  economic	  climate	  from	  that	  of	  the	  US	  will	  be	  taken	  into	  account.	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6http://www.salon.com/2013/05/30/half_of_americans_living_below_or_near_poverty_line_partner/	  	  	  7	  http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/population/bednost/tabl/1-­‐2-­‐1.htm	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   HYPOTHESES	  	   The	  reviewed	  literature	  allows	  me	  to	  generate	  a	  number	  of	  general	  hypotheses	  that	  could	  be	  applicable	  to	  a	  broad	  multi-­‐country	  analysis.	  Building	  on	  Edwards	  and	  Swenson’s	  (1997)	  argument,	  I	  can	  hypothesize	  that:	  
H1:	  Those	  who	  rallied	  in	  Russia	  between	  October	  2013	  and	  July	  2014	  did	  not	  radically	  
oppose	  the	  regime,	  instead,	  they	  demonstrated	  just	  mild	  discontent.	  	  
H2:	  I	  expect	  those	  who	  rallied	  to	  have	  paid	  closer	  attention	  to	  state	  news	  broadcast	  on	  
Russia’s	  federal	  channels.	  	  
H3:	  I	  expect	  that	  the	  older	  an	  individual	  is,	  the	  more	  likely	  she/he	  will	  be	  to	  rally.	  
Moreover,	  I	  anticipate	  the	  correlation	  between	  age	  and	  likelihood	  of	  rallying	  to	  be	  quite	  
significant	  in	  the	  Russian	  case.	  Using	  Baum’s	  application	  of	  Zaller’s	  model	  that	  deals	  with	  individuals’	  political	  awareness	  and	  its	  affect	  on	  the	  likelihood	  of	  rallying,	  I	  can	  hypothesize	  that:	  
H4:	  Since	  people	  with	  low	  levels	  of	  political	  awareness	  are	  unlikely	  to	  be	  involved	  in	  
rally	  events	  and	  people	  with	  high	  levels	  of	  political	  awareness	  are	  unlikely	  to	  change	  
their	  formed	  opinions,	  I	  expect	  to	  find	  people	  with	  moderate	  political	  awareness	  were	  
more	  likely	  to	  rally.	  Political	  awareness	  is	  measured	  by	  paying	  closer	  attention	  to	  a	  
number	  of	  various	  media	  outlets,	  not	  limited	  to	  state	  TV	  channels.8	  	  	   However,	  unlike	  Baum,	  by	  political	  awareness	  I	  understand	  close	  attention	  to	  and	  interest	  in	  international	  news	  coming	  from	  a	  variety	  of	  sources	  and	  not	  limited	  to	  Russia’s	  federal	  channels	  (as	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Despite	  the	  seeming	  contradiction	  to	  H2,	  the	  two	  hypotheses	  look	  at	  different	  groups	  of	  people	  that	  are	  both	  likely	  to	  rally.	  While	  in	  H2	  I	  focus	  on	  the	  effect	  of	  state	  TV	  on	  individuals,	  H4	  talks	  about	  individuals’	  varying	  levels	  of	  interest	  in	  politics.	  I	  hence	  argue	  that	  those	  who	  are	  moderately	  interested	  in	  politics	  (and	  thus	  use	  multiple	  media	  outlets	  as	  media	  sources)	  are	  likely	  to	  rally	  as	  well.	  	  
19	  	   	   	   	  	  
measured	  by	  time	  spent	  reading/consulting	  news	  sources).	  It	  is	  often	  measured	  with	  a	  number	  of	  questions	  about	  politics	  (Zaller	  1992;	  Price	  and	  Zaller	  1993;	  Delli	  Carpini	  and	  Keeter	  1996).	  	   Lai	  and	  Reiter	  (2005)	  suggest	  that	  rallies	  happen	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  direct	  threat	  to	  national	  wellbeing.	  I	  thus	  hypothesize	  that:	  	  
H5:	  Those	  who	  rallied	  must	  have	  seen	  the	  Ukrainian	  crisis	  as	  a	  direct	  threat	  to	  Russia’s	  
wellbeing/security.	  	  The	  extensive	  research	  of	  Page	  and	  Shapiro	  (1992)	  and	  Mueller	  (1973,	  1994)	  who	  argue	  that	  women	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  opposed	  to	  use	  of	  force	  in	  international	  crises	  allows	  me	  to	  put	  forward	  the	  hypothesis	  that:	  	  
H6:	  Women	  were	  less	  likely	  to	  rally	  than	  men.	  	  Based	  on	  Feinstein’s	  (2010)	  theory,	  I	  can	  hypothesize	  that:	  
H7:	  Individuals	  who	  rallied	  round	  the	  flag,	  expressed	  more	  nationalistic	  sentiment	  and	  
were	  proud	  of	  Russia	  and	  Russia’s	  handling	  of	  the	  international	  conflict.	  	  Building	  on	  the	  work	  of	  Horowitz	  and	  Levendusky	  (2012),	  I	  hypothesize	  that:	  
H8:	  Individuals	  who	  rallied	  considered	  the	  president’s	  explanation	  of	  the	  country’s	  
involvement	  in	  the	  conflict	  legitimate/the	  only	  right	  thing	  to	  do.	  	  Finally,	  according	  to	  Parker	  (1995),	  in	  the	  US	  context,	  rallying	  individuals	  included	  those	  whose	  economic	  situation	  both	  improved	  and	  deteriorated	  in	  the	  time	  of	  the	  international	  crisis;	  thus,	  the	  change	  in	  one’s	  financial	  situation	  didn’t	  have	  any	  effect	  on	  determining	  who	  will	  rally.	  And	  even	  though	  I	  believe	  that	  Russia’s	  population	  might	  be	  more	  sensitive	  to	  negative	  changes	  in	  their	  finances	  than	  their	  American	  counterparts	  (as	  I	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  section),	  I	  believe	  that	  the	  change	  (positive	  and	  negative)	  in	  an	  individual’s	  economic	  situation	  as	  well	  as	  her/his	  subjective	  evaluation	  of	  the	  financial	  situation	  in	  the	  family	  will	  have	  no	  significant	  affect	  on	  the	  probability	  of	  rallying.	  I	  thus	  hypothesize	  that:	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H9:	  Individuals’	  subjective	  evaluation	  of	  their	  financial	  situation	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  crisis	  
as	  well	  as	  the	  change	  (either	  positive	  or	  negative)	  in	  their	  economic	  situation	  will	  have	  
no	  to	  little	  effect	  on	  their	  willingness	  to	  rally.	  I	  thus	  expect	  that	  both	  people	  whose	  
economic	  situation	  has	  improved	  and	  decreased	  in	  the	  time	  before	  the	  crisis	  will	  rally.	  	  In	  the	  next	  section	  I	  will	  turn	  to	  the	  description	  of	  my	  data	  and	  methodology.	  I	  will	  explain	  why	  I	  use	  panel	  data	  analysis	  in	  my	  work	  and	  why	  it	  will	  allow	  me	  to	  get	  the	  most	  accurate	  and	  precise	  results	  in	  determining	  who	  rallied	  in	  Russia.	  I	  will	  then	  evaluate	  the	  results.	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  DATA	  AND	  METHODOLOGY	  	   To	  test	  the	  presented	  hypotheses	  and	  to	  understand	  what	  types	  of	  individuals	  rallied	  in	  Russia,	  I	  will	  use	  panel	  data	  analysis.	  In	  other	  words,	  I	  will	  analyze	  the	  responses	  of	  individuals	  that	  participated	  in	  the	  same	  survey	  at	  two	  different	  points	  in	  time	  –	  October	  2013	  and	  July	  2014.	  Using	  panel	  data	  gives	  me	  a	  rare	  opportunity	  to	  study	  opinion	  change	  on	  an	  individual	  level	  and	  put	  a	  face	  to	  the	  abstract	  idea	  of	  the	  rally-­‐round-­‐the-­‐flag	  effect	  in	  Russia.	  	  The	  survey	  was	  conducted	  online	  by	  a	  Russian	  research	  firm	  Synovate	  ComCon	  and	  focused	  on	  Russia’s	  bigger	  cities	  with	  a	  population	  over	  a	  million	  (which	  includes	  Moscow,	  St	  Petersburg,	  Novosibirsk	  and	  twelve	  others).9	  The	  segment	  of	  the	  population	  that	  was	  of	  most	  interest	  for	  my	  research	  included	  better-­‐off,	  educated	  people	  who	  were	  active	  users	  of	  Internet.	  A	  sample	  of	  350,000	  individuals	  from	  around	  Russia	  participated	  in	  Synovate	  ComCon’s	  Internet	  panel.	  However,	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  research,	  the	  target	  sample	  was	  narrowed	  down	  to	  include	  better-­‐off	  people	  aged	  between	  16	  and	  65	  with	  some	  levels	  of	  higher	  education	  and	  residing	  in	  a	  city	  with	  the	  population	  over	  one	  million.	  Invitations	  were	  divided	  according	  to	  gender	  and	  age.	  Moreover,	  respondents	  were	  then	  selected	  based	  on	  their	  education	  level,	  city	  of	  residence,	  and	  income	  level.	  To	  test	  the	  income	  level,	  respondents	  were	  asked,	  “How	  would	  you	  describe	  the	  financial	  status	  of	  your	  family?”	  They	  were	  then	  presented	  with	  six	  possible	  answers	  and	  were	  requested	  to	  pick	  one	  response	  that	  more	  accurately	  reflected	  their	  economic	  situation.	  Only	  those	  respondents	  who	  evaluated	  their	  financial	  situation	  as	  3	  and	  higher10	  were	  asked	  to	  continue	  filling	  out	  the	  full	  questionnaire.	  In	  the	  end,	  we	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  http://www.statdata.ru/goroda-­‐millionniki-­‐rossii-­‐po-­‐naseleniu	  	  	  10	  The	  possible	  answers	  were:	  (1)	  Not	  enough	  money	  even	  for	  food;	  (2)	  We	  can	  buy	  food,	  but	  it	  would	  be	  hard	  to	  buy	  clothes;	  (3)	  We	  can	  buy	  food	  and	  clothes,	  but	  it	  would	  be	  hard	  to	  buy	  a	  television,	  fridge,	  or	  washing	  machine;	  (4)	  We	  can	  buy	  major	  household	  appliances,	  but	  would	  not	  afford	  a	  new	  car;	  (5)	  Our	  earnings	  are	  enough	  for	  anything,	  but	  such	  expensive	  things	  like	  a	  dacha	  or	  an	  apartment,	  and	  (6)	  No	  financial	  difficulties,	  could	  buy	  a	  dacha	  or	  apartment	  if	  needed.	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were	  able	  to	  narrow	  down	  our	  target	  group	  to	  about	  1,200	  respondents.	  	  Among	  this	  target	  group,	  however,	  only	  715	  completed	  the	  second	  round	  of	  the	  survey	  in	  July	  2014.	  After	  analyzing	  the	  data	  of	  who	  withdrew	  from	  the	  survey,	  I	  was	  not	  able	  to	  find	  a	  pattern	  that	  would	  have	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  our	  results—the	  proportional	  makeup	  of	  the	  various	  categories	  (gender,	  education	  level,	  age,	  etc.)	  stayed	  roughly	  the	  same.	  One	  observation	  that	  is	  nevertheless	  worth	  mentioning	  is	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  those	  who	  said	  they	  were	  following	  politics	  closely	  in	  the	  second	  round	  compared	  to	  the	  first	  one.	  This	  rise	  in	  numbers,	  though	  of	  interest,	  could	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  large	  international	  crisis	  Russia	  was	  involved	  in	  just	  prior	  to	  and	  during	  the	  second	  round	  of	  the	  survey	  as	  well	  as	  the	  relative	  geographical	  proximity	  of	  this	  crisis.	  	  The	  internet	  survey	  that	  we	  used	  for	  this	  research	  has	  four	  main	  distinctions	  from	  a	  nationally	  representative	  survey:	  First,	  I	  am	  only	  interested	  in	  the	  individuals	  who	  live	  in	  bigger	  cities,	  and	  this	  group	  of	  people	  constitutes	  just	  over	  31	  percent	  of	  the	  national	  sample.11	  Second,	  one	  of	  our	  points	  of	  interest	  was	  some	  level	  of	  higher	  education,	  which	  eliminated	  about	  67	  percent	  of	  the	  national	  sample.	  Further,	  only	  Internet	  users	  finished	  filling	  in	  out	  the	  presented	  questionnaire,	  and	  the	  group	  of	  Internet-­‐literate	  individuals	  constitutes	  about	  59	  percent	  of	  the	  national	  sample.	  And	  finally,	  we	  were	  only	  interested	  in	  the	  group	  of	  people	  who	  were	  financially	  secure	  enough	  to	  be	  able	  to	  at	  least	  afford	  food	  and	  clothes.	  This	  will	  roughly	  translate	  into	  a	  monthly	  income	  that	  exceeds	  RUB15,000	  (about	  $450	  at	  the	  time)	  and	  would	  include	  about	  two-­‐thirds	  of	  the	  national	  sample.	  Combined,	  the	  group	  of	  individuals	  that	  is	  of	  direct	  interest	  for	  this	  research	  constitutes	  about	  11.3	  percent	  of	  those	  in	  a	  nationally	  representative	  sample	  of	  Levada	  Center.	  	  There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  reasons	  why	  I	  chose	  the	  described	  sampling	  method	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  nationally	  representative	  sample	  in	  this	  research.	  Firstly,	  since	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  work	  is	  the	  opinion	  change	  within	  Russian	  opposition,	  panel	  data	  analysis	  would	  help	  us,	  while	  holding	  individuals	  constant,	  trace	  the	  changes	  in	  their	  opinions—a	  broader	  and	  more	  inclusive	  sample	  would	  not	  give	  us	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  I	  will	  use	  the	  national	  sample	  data	  provided	  by	  Russia’s	  independent	  survey	  company,	  Levada	  Center.	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the	  necessary	  details	  about	  the	  people	  who	  oppose	  the	  ruling	  regime	  and	  their	  change	  of	  mind.	  Sorting	  through	  in	  order	  to	  separate	  a	  smaller,	  more	  refined,	  sample	  leads	  to	  a	  noticeable	  increase	  in	  the	  level	  of	  opposition	  mood,	  and	  as	  a	  result,	  leads	  to	  more	  statistical	  significance	  assigned	  to	  the	  answers	  of	  individuals.	  However,	  since	  we	  focus	  only	  on	  a	  small	  part	  of	  the	  nationally	  representative	  sample,	  the	  results	  we	  get	  for	  this	  group	  will	  not	  be	  applicable	  to	  the	  country’s	  broad	  population.	  This	  could	  be	  a	  significant	  problem	  for	  research	  that	  looks	  to	  make	  implications	  for	  the	  country’s	  population	  as	  a	  whole	  and	  analyze	  general	  movements,	  but	  since	  I	  am	  most	  interested	  in	  the	  relationship	  between	  regime	  opponents	  and	  the	  regime,	  this	  drawback	  does	  not	  hinder	  my	  analysis.	  	  Secondly,	  as	  Hsiao	  (2006)	  argues,	  panel	  data	  allows	  researchers	  to	  analyze	  human	  behavior	  more	  accurately.	  Another	  benefit	  of	  this	  methodology	  (and,	  arguably,	  one	  of	  the	  main	  ones	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  thesis)	  is	  the	  ability	  to	  weigh	  the	  relative	  importance	  of	  different	  independent	  variables.	  By	  not	  including	  certain	  independent	  variables	  into	  the	  equation,	  we	  will	  be	  able	  to	  analyze	  the	  importance	  or	  influence	  of	  these	  variables	  in	  tilting	  the	  balance	  of	  an	  individual’s	  opinion.	  But	  most	  importantly,	  this	  methodology	  will	  allow	  us	  to	  predict	  the	  likelihood	  of	  certain	  types	  of	  individuals	  to	  rally	  in	  the	  case	  of	  an	  international	  crisis.	   	  Panel	  data	  analysis	  is	  infrequently	  used	  in	  the	  rally-­‐round-­‐the-­‐flag	  literature.	  Only	  a	  few	  studies	  have	  used	  this	  method	  to	  trace	  individual	  changes	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  the	  rally-­‐round-­‐the-­‐flag	  effect.	  In	  1997,	  Edwards	  and	  Swenson	  used	  panel	  data	  analysis	  in	  their	  research	  to	  find	  out	  who	  were	  the	  people	  that	  rallied	  and	  changed	  their	  opinion	  about	  President	  Clinton	  following	  US	  bombing	  attacks	  on	  Iraq.	  Their	  research,	  though	  undoubtedly	  highly	  significant	  for	  the	  study	  of	  the	  phenomenon,	  leaves	  some	  potentially	  meaningful	  variables	  unanalyzed.	  For	  example,	  their	  research	  does	  not	  examine	  individuals’	  economic	  conditions	  –	  a	  variable	  that	  was	  found	  to	  be	  closely	  linked	  with	  presidents’	  popularity.	  	  Another	  factor	  that	  was	  not	  analyzed	  though	  could	  be	  of	  certain	  interest,	  is	  the	  pronounced	  nationalist	  sentiment	  likely	  to	  be	  expressed	  by	  those	  who	  rally.	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In	  1994,	  McLeod,	  Eveland	  and	  Signorielli	  employed	  panel	  data	  analysis	  to	  study	  the	  dissipation	  of	  rally	  effects	  after	  the	  Persian	  Gulf	  War.	  They	  find	  that	  a	  year	  after	  the	  rally	  event	  the	  support	  of	  the	  president	  and	  the	  approval	  of	  his	  actions	  give	  way	  to	  disappointment	  and	  reverse	  change	  of	  opinion.	  In	  2009,	  Kriner	  and	  Schwartz	  used	  panel	  data	  analysis	  to	  argue	  that	  factors	  that	  align	  with	  or	  oppose	  individuals’	  pre-­‐existing	  partisan	  biases	  will	  play	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  determining	  who	  will	  rally	  around	  the	  flag	  and	  when.	  	  The	  previous	  studies	  that	  used	  panel	  data	  analysis	  to	  look	  at	  the	  rally-­‐round-­‐the-­‐flag	  effect	  served	  as	  a	  valuable	  basis	  for	  my	  research.	  In	  this	  thesis	  I	  build	  on	  them,	  including	  a	  number	  of	  new	  variables	  that	  I	  show	  have	  a	  significant	  effect.	  Moreover,	  my	  analysis	  of	  the	  Russian	  case	  breaks	  new	  ground	  and	  allows	  me	  to	  take	  a	  fresh	  look	  at	  the	  rally-­‐round-­‐the-­‐flag	  effect	  in	  a	  largely	  unexamined	  setting	  of	  Eastern	  Europe	  and	  the	  new	  authoritarian	  environment.	  	  	  In	  the	  next	  section	  I	  will	  analyze	  the	  results	  and	  summarize	  the	  findings.	  I	  will	  then	  discuss	  the	  broader	  implications	  of	  my	  research	  and	  touch	  upon	  the	  important	  questions	  on	  the	  topic	  that	  need	  to	  be	  addressed	  in	  future	  research.	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   There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  different	  ways	  of	  analyzing	  panel	  data	  (Finkel	  1995).	  In	  this	  paper,	  I	  have	  data	  from	  a	  two-­‐wave	  opinion	  survey.	  The	  principal	  dependent	  variable	  of	  interest	  is	  the	  level	  of	  approval	  for	  President	  Putin	  as	  expressed	  in	  each	  of	  the	  waves.	  Since	  the	  level	  of	  approval	  in	  the	  second	  round	  is	  clearly	  dependent	  at	  least	  in	  part	  on	  the	  level	  of	  approval	  in	  the	  first	  round,	  I	  estimate	  a	  static-­‐score	  panel	  model	  (Plewis	  1985),	  which	  includes	  a	  lagged	  dependent	  variable.	  To	  capture	  any	  non-­‐linearities	  in	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  lagged	  dependent	  variable,	  I	  also	  include	  a	  squared	  lag.	  To	  reduce	  problems	  of	  collinearity	  between	  the	  lagged	  dependent	  variable	  and	  the	  squared	  lag,	  I	  zero-­‐center	  both	  variables.	  The	  remainder	  of	  the	  independent	  variables	  either	  do	  not	  vary	  between	  the	  two	  waves	  (e.g.	  sex,	  previous	  voting	  behavior)	  or	  are	  lagged.	  The	  one	  exception	  is	  family	  finances,	  where	  I	  include	  both	  the	  lagged	  effect	  and	  the	  change	  between	  rounds,	  as	  I	  expect	  both	  measures	  of	  a	  respondent’s	  current	  financial	  situation	  to	  affect	  levels	  of	  presidential	  approval.	  Tables	  1	  and	  2	  present	  the	  results.	  The	  models	  used	  are	  ordered	  probit	  to	  take	  into	  account	  that	  the	  dependent	  variable	  has	  four	  ordered	  categories,	  though	  the	  results	  are	  substantively	  unchanged	  if	  we	  use	  OLS	  models.	  Tables	  1	  and	  2	  present	  odds-­‐ratios,	  which	  represent	  the	  change	  in	  the	  odds	  of	  being	  in	  particular	  category	  on	  the	  dependent	  variable	  for	  a	  one	  unit	  change	  in	  the	  independent	  variable.	  Odds	  ratios	  of	  1	  indicate	  no	  change,	  while	  scores	  less	  than	  1	  indicate	  a	  negative	  effect	  and	  scores	  greater	  than	  1	  positive	  effects.	  Z	  statistics	  are	  shown	  in	  parentheses.	  Since	  we	  include	  a	  lagged	  dependent	  variable,	  the	  coefficients	  in	  the	  model	  can	  be	  interpreted	  as	  the	  effect	  on	  the	  presidential	  approval,	  but	  also	  as	  the	  effect	  on	  the	  change	  in	  presidential	  approval	  controlling	  for	  previous	  approval.	  Since	  my	  hypotheses	  relate	  to	  rally	  effects	  –	  or	  changes	  in	  presidential	  approval	  –	  I	  use	  the	  latter	  interpretation.	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Table	  1	  addresses	  the	  first	  six	  hypotheses	  of	  my	  paper.	  Model	  1	  controls	  for	  presidential	  approval	  individuals	  demonstrated	  in	  round	  1	  of	  the	  survey.	  The	  coefficient	  that	  is	  associated	  with	  Approval	  R1	  implies	  that	  individuals’	  past	  approval	  has	  a	  positive	  and	  statistically	  significant	  impact	  on	  one’s	  current	  approval,	  holding	  the	  effects	  of	  all	  other	  variables	  included	  in	  the	  model	  constant	  (3.05).	  However,	  to	  test	  my	  first	  hypothesis	  and	  see	  whether	  the	  degree	  of	  previous	  disapproval	  has	  any	  effect	  on	  the	  likelihood	  of	  rallying,	  we	  included	  the	  squared	  lag	  in	  order	  to	  capture	  non-­‐linearity.	  The	  results	  show	  that	  my	  expectations	  were	  not	  supported	  and	  that	  more	  moderate	  degrees	  of	  presidential	  disapproval	  are	  not	  positively	  associated	  with	  the	  likelihood	  of	  rallying	  (p>0.1).	  In	  addition,	  model	  1	  shows	  that	  being	  a	  non-­‐voter	  and	  voting	  previously	  for	  Ziuganov	  (representative	  of	  the	  systemic	  opposition)	  or	  Prokhorov	  is	  statistically	  significant	  and	  is	  negatively	  associated	  with	  the	  likelihood	  of	  rallying	  (0.77,	  0.65,	  and	  0.72	  respectively)	  even	  controlling	  for	  the	  previous	  level	  of	  approval.	  Furthermore,	  the	  model	  shows	  that	  more	  favorable	  perceptions	  by	  individuals	  of	  their	  own	  financial	  situations	  in	  the	  first	  round	  is	  statistically	  significant	  and	  is	  positively	  correlated	  with	  the	  likelihood	  of	  rallying	  (1.30).	  	  In	  the	  second	  model,	  I	  look	  at	  the	  effects	  that	  the	  number	  of	  information	  sources	  the	  individuals	  used	  had	  on	  their	  likelihood	  of	  rallying.	  The	  results	  show	  that	  watching	  state	  TV	  is	  both	  statistically	  significant	  and	  associated	  with	  a	  higher	  likelihood	  of	  rallying	  (1.51).	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  being	  a	  LiveJournal	  user	  (a	  popular	  blogging	  website	  that	  has	  been	  actively	  and	  predominantly	  used	  by	  the	  Russian	  opposition)	  will	  be	  associated	  with	  lower	  odds	  of	  individuals	  approving	  of	  Putin	  and	  rallying	  (0.61).	  Model	  3	  looks	  at	  the	  effect	  that	  an	  individual’s	  interest	  in	  politics	  has	  on	  the	  likelihood	  of	  rallying.	  Contrary	  to	  my	  expectations,	  the	  results	  demonstrate	  that	  neither	  the	  overall	  interest	  in	  politics	  (Interest	  R1),	  nor	  having	  a	  moderate	  level	  of	  political	  awareness	  (i.e.	  being	  moderately	  interested	  in	  politics)	  (Interest	  R1	  squared	  lag)	  has	  any	  statistical	  significance	  and	  affects	  the	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likelihood	  of	  rallying	  (p>0.1).	  The	  variables,	  which	  were	  statistically	  significant	  in	  the	  first	  model,	  remain	  statistically	  significant	  in	  model	  3.	  	  Model	  4	  is	  the	  biggest	  model	  of	  my	  regression	  table,	  and	  it	  looks	  at	  the	  effects	  of	  both	  the	  exposure	  to	  various	  media	  sources	  and	  individuals’	  interest	  in	  politics	  on	  the	  likelihood	  of	  rallying;	  additionally,	  it	  also	  incorporates	  an	  interaction	  term	  between	  the	  level	  of	  interest	  in	  politics	  and	  exposure	  to	  state	  TV.	  The	  model	  shows	  that	  the	  interaction	  term	  fails	  to	  reach	  statistical	  significance	  (p>0.1).	  Thus,	  being	  more	  interested	  in	  politics	  as	  well	  as	  being	  interested	  in	  politics	  and	  being	  exposed	  to	  state	  TV	  at	  the	  same	  time	  doesn’t	  affect	  the	  likelihood	  of	  rallying	  (0.96	  and	  0.92	  respectively).	  Being	  a	  state	  TV	  viewer,	  however,	  continues	  to	  be	  statistically	  significant	  in	  this	  model	  (1.57),	  and	  so	  is	  being	  a	  LiveJournal	  user	  (0.62).	  The	  statistical	  significance	  of	  being	  a	  non-­‐voter	  or	  being	  a	  Ziuganov	  or	  Prokhorov	  voter	  isn’t	  stable	  and	  varies	  throughout	  the	  models:	  model	  4	  shows	  that	  being	  a	  non-­‐voter	  or	  a	  Prokhorov	  voter	  loses	  its	  statistical	  significance,	  while	  being	  a	  Ziuganov	  voter	  remains	  statistically	  significant	  and	  negatively	  associated	  with	  the	  likelihood	  of	  rallying.	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  regime	  and	  opposition	  supporters	  choose	  different	  media	  sources—opposition	  supporters	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  use	  LiveJournal	  to	  get	  their	  news,	  while	  regime	  supporters	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  turn	  to	  state	  television	  (Robertson	  2015).	  As	  a	  result,	  when	  I	  control	  for	  media	  use,	  the	  statistical	  significance	  of	  political	  preferences	  appears	  to	  decline.	  	  Models	  5	  and	  6	  look	  at	  the	  effect	  of	  individuals’	  perceptions	  of	  Ukraine	  as	  Russia’s	  enemy	  in	  the	  first	  round	  and	  the	  second	  round	  respectively	  on	  the	  likelihood	  of	  rallying.	  The	  results	  in	  model	  5	  demonstrate	  that	  individuals’	  perceptions	  of	  Ukraine	  as	  Russia’s	  enemy	  in	  the	  first	  round	  of	  the	  survey	  have	  no	  statistical	  significance	  (p>0.1).	  Moreover,	  contrary	  to	  my	  expectations,	  Model	  6	  shows	  that	  seeing	  Ukraine	  as	  Russia’s	  enemy	  in	  round	  2	  of	  the	  survey	  is	  statistically	  significant	  and	  is	  negatively	  associated	  with	  individuals’	  likelihood	  of	  rallying.	  However,	  since	  this	  question	  wasn’t	  relevant	  in	  round	  1	  of	  the	  survey	  (because	  in	  October	  2013	  the	  anti-­‐Yanukovich	  protests	  had	  not	  yet	  begun	  and	  it	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Table	  1	  
DV: Putin Approval (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ordered Probit Previous 
Approval 






       
Non Voter 0.77** 0.81 0.76** 0.81 0.75** 0.81 
 (-2.00) (-1.59) (-2.05) (-1.57) (-2.08) (-1.45) 
Prokhorov 0.72** 0.79 0.72** 0.79 0.73** 0.73** 
 (-2.30) (-1.60) (-2.26) (-1.58) (-2.12) (-2.01) 
Ziuganov 0.65** 0.67* 0.66** 0.68* 0.75 0.71 
 (-2.09) (-1.94) (-2.07) (-1.87) (-1.32) (-1.61) 
Private Sector 0.91 0.91 0.90 0.89 0.91 0.93 
 (-0.98) (-0.95) (-1.03) (-1.06) (-0.93) (-0.69) 
Wealth 1.05 1.05 1.06 1.06 1.02 1.02 
 (0.72) (0.71) (0.78) (0.79) (0.34) (0.20) 
Education 1.02 0.99 1.02 0.98 1.03 1.04 
 (0.13) (-0.10) (0.13) (-0.11) (0.18) (0.24) 
Female 0.97 0.94 0.96 0.91 0.97 0.94 
 (-0.26) (-0.64) (-0.38) (-0.85) (-0.33) (-0.56) 
Age 0.98 0.94 0.98 0.93 0.99 0.96 
 (-0.56) (-1.48) (-0.53) (-1.48) (-0.12) (-0.82) 
Moscow 0.88 0.92 0.89 0.93 0.87 0.90 
 (-1.19) (-0.83) (-1.10) (-0.68) (-1.29) (-0.92) 
Finances R1 1.30*** 1.30*** 1.29*** 1.29*** 1.33*** 1.29*** 
 (2.90) (2.86) (2.82) (2.83) (3.10) (2.59) 
Change Finances 1.40*** 1.42*** 1.40*** 1.43*** 1.47*** 1.41*** 
 (4.22) (4.36) (4.20) (4.40) (4.59) (3.97) 
Approval R1 3.05*** 3.01*** 3.06*** 3.01*** 3.01*** 3.08*** 
 (12.91) (12.45) (12.82) (12.30) (12.27) (12.08) 
Approval R1 (squared lag) 1.07 1.11 1.07 1.10 1.04 1.08 
 (0.93) (1.37) (0.89) (1.29) (0.58) (0.96) 
State TV R1  1.51***  1.57***   
  (3.82)  (4.01)   
Vkontakte R1  1.07  1.08   
  (0.59)  (0.62)   
Live R1  0.61***  0.62***   
  (-3.67)  (-3.51)   
Facebook R1  1.05  1.07   
  (0.36)  (0.48)   
Interest R1   0.96 0.98   
   (-0.53) (-0.22)   
Interest R1 (squared lag)   1.03 1.04   
   (0.48) (0.49)   
Interest*TV    0.92   
    (-0.58)   
Enemy R1     0.97  
     (-0.79)  
Enemy R2      0.91** 
      (-2.50) 
Observations 583 583 581 581 537 492 z-­‐statistics	  in	  parentheses	  ***	  p<0.01,	  **	  p<0.05,	  *	  p<0.1	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Table	  2	  presents	  a	  set	  of	  models	  that	  examines	  the	  impact	  of	  patriotism	  on	  the	  likelihood	  of	  rallying.	  I	  measured	  patriotism	  in	  four	  different	  ways:	  as	  subjective	  self-­‐perception	  of	  individuals	  as	  belonging	  to	  (1)	  the	  Russian	  state,	  (2)	  Russian	  culture,	  (3)	  Russian	  ethnic	  group,	  or	  (4)	  the	  main	  religious	  denomination	  in	  Russia.	  The	  results	  show	  that	  feeling	  part	  of	  the	  Russian	  state,	  seeing	  oneself	  as	  ethnically	  Russian,	  and	  feeling	  a	  sense	  of	  belonging	  to	  the	  Russian	  Orthodox	  Church	  were	  all	  statistically	  significant	  and	  positively	  associated	  with	  higher	  likelihood	  of	  rallying	  (1.16,	  1.12	  and	  1.13	  respectively).	  The	  only	  variable	  that	  was	  not	  statistically	  significant	  was	  feeling	  part	  of	  Russian	  culture	  (0.99).	  This	  could	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  vagueness	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  culture	  and	  the	  unpredictability	  of	  the	  individuals’	  interpretation	  of	  it.	  Additionally,	  culture	  is	  often	  closely	  linked	  to	  education,	  higher	  levels	  of	  which,	  in	  turn,	  are	  associated	  with	  lower	  degrees	  of	  support	  for	  the	  regime	  and	  higher	  degrees	  of	  support	  for	  the	  opposition.	  	  Finally,	  model	  5	  in	  the	  Table	  2	  looks	  at	  the	  effects	  of	  individuals’	  perception	  of	  Russia’s	  actions	  in	  Ukraine	  as	  legitimate	  on	  the	  likelihood	  of	  rallying.	  The	  results	  show	  that	  the	  belief	  that	  Russia’s	  actions	  in	  eastern	  Ukraine	  are	  legitimate	  is	  strongly	  and	  positively	  associated	  with	  the	  likelihood	  of	  rallying	  (1.76).	  Moreover,	  contrary	  to	  my	  hypothesis,	  the	  second	  set	  of	  models	  (i.e.,	  Table	  2)	  demonstrates	  the	  extreme	  stability	  of	  the	  coefficients	  that	  are	  associated	  with	  a	  favorable	  or	  improving	  financial	  situation	  (see	  Finances	  R1	  and	  Change	  Finances).	  The	  impact	  of	  individuals’	  perceived	  income	  status	  and	  improvement	  of	  their	  financial	  situation	  on	  rallying	  does	  not	  change	  in	  the	  two	  sets	  of	  models;	  it	  remains	  positive	  and	  statistically	  significant.	  The	  coefficients	  of	  being	  a	  non-­‐voter	  or	  being	  a	  Ziuganov	  or	  Prokhorov	  voter	  are	  not	  stable	  as	  their	  statistical	  significance,	  when	  present,	  varies	  throughout	  the	  models,	  though	  remains	  negatively	  associated	  with	  the	  likelihood	  of	  rallying.	  While	  being	  a	  non-­‐voter	  is	  statistically	  significant	  in	  models	  2,	  3,	  4,	  and	  5,	  it	  lacks	  statistical	  significance	  in	  model	  1.	  Similarly,	  being	  a	  Prokhorov	  voter	  is	  statistically	  significant	  in	  models	  1,	  2,	  3,	  and	  4	  and	  loses	  its	  statistical	  significance	  in	  model	  5.	  Likewise,	  the	  coefficient	  associated	  with	  being	  a	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Table	  2	  
DV: Putin Approval (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Ordered Probit 
State Culture Ethnicity Orthodoxy Legitimacy 
      
Non Voter 0.81 0.77** 0.76** 0.76** 0.76* 
 (-1.59) (-2.00) (-2.12) (-2.08) (-1.84) 
Prokhorov Voter 0.75** 0.72** 0.72** 0.72** 0.82 
 (-2.00) (-2.30) (-2.26) (-2.24) (-1.27) 
Ziuganov Voter 0.62** 0.65 0.64* 0.66** 0.71 
 (-2.30) (-2.09) (-2.20) (-2.04) (-1.56) 
Private Sector 0.89 0.91 0.90 0.89 0.97 
 (-1.15) (-0.97) (-1.06) (-1.10) (-0.24) 
Wealth 1.06 1.05 1.07 1.05 1.03 
 (0.77) (0.72) (0.91) (0.67) (0.37) 
Education 1.04 1.02 1.02 1.03 1.11 
 (0.24) (0.14) (0.11) (0.19) (0.62) 
Female 0.96 0.98 0.97 0.92 1.08 
 (-0.40) (-0.24) (-0.32) (-0.83) (0.67) 
Age 0.96 0.98 0.96 0.96 0.96 
 (-0.91) (-0.53) (-0.99) (-0.97) (-0.97) 
Moscow 0.87 0.89 0.84 0.86 0.92 
 (-1.38) (-1.18) (-1.62) (-1.49) (-0.76) 
Finances R1 1.30*** 1.30*** 1.31*** 1.31*** 1.28** 
 (2.88) (2.90) (2.99) (3.00) (2.43) 
Change Finances 1.41*** 1.40*** 1.41*** 1.43*** 1.44*** 
 (4.33) (4.21) (4.33) (4.47) (4.07) 
Approval R1 2.90*** 3.05*** 3.04*** 2.93*** 3.01*** 
 (12.17) (12.88) (12.86) (12.31) (10.91) 
Approval R1 Sq 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.12 
 (0.94) (0.93) (0.89) (0.91) (1.37) 
State Patriot 1.16***     
 (3.48)     
Culture  0.99    
  (-0.12)    
Nation   1.12**   
   (2.54)   
Orthodoxy    1.13***  
    (3.57)  
Bloodshed     1.76*** 
     (9.26) 
      
Observations 583 583 583 583 512 z-­‐statistics	  in	  parentheses	  ***	  p<0.01,	  **	  p<0.05,	  *	  p<0.1	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   GENERAL	  DISCUSSION	  AND	  CONCLUSION	  
	   The	  idea	  for	  writing	  this	  paper	  emerged	  following	  Putin’s	  rising	  popularity	  in	  March	  2014,	  as	  more	  and	  more	  former	  regime	  opponents	  changed	  their	  opinions	  about	  the	  president	  and	  rallied	  around	  the	  Russian	  flag.	  The	  results	  I	  obtained	  allowed	  me	  to	  answer	  the	  question	  of	  who	  were	  these	  people	  and	  what	  characteristics	  they	  shared,	  which	  eventually	  put	  me	  one	  step	  closer	  to	  answering	  another	  big	  question:	  Why	  did	  they	  change	  their	  opinion	  and	  why	  did	  Putin’s	  gambit	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  so	  successful?	  	  A	  lot	  of	  research	  has	  been	  dedicated	  to	  studying	  the	  rally-­‐round-­‐the-­‐flag	  effect,	  but	  Russia	  and	  Eastern	  Europe	  remain	  largely	  underexplored.	  In	  this	  paper	  I	  shifted	  the	  study	  of	  this	  phenomenon	  from	  its	  usual	  US	  focus	  and	  analyzed	  who	  are	  the	  people	  that	  changed	  their	  opinions	  about	  the	  president	  for	  the	  better	  in	  Russia	  amidst	  the	  ongoing	  Ukrainian	  crisis.	  My	  goal	  was	  to	  determine	  whether	  they	  are	  similar	  to	  the	  ones	  who	  rally	  in	  the	  US,	  whether	  analogous	  incentives	  are	  at	  work	  in	  an	  authoritarian	  regime	  as	  in	  a	  liberal	  democracy	  and	  whether	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  predict	  how	  certain	  people	  will	  react	  to	  an	  international	  crisis	  both	  in	  Russia	  in	  the	  coming	  years	  and	  in	  other	  authoritarian	  regimes?	  	  Previous	  research	  found	  that	  the	  variables	  that	  mattered	  most	  in	  determining	  who	  will	  change	  their	  opinions	  about	  the	  president	  and	  rally	  were	  the	  (1)	  degree	  of	  previous	  disapproval	  of	  the	  president,	  (2)	  attention	  to	  news	  channels	  coupled	  with	  lower	  degrees	  of	  previous	  disapproval,	  and	  (3)	  perception	  of	  the	  international	  conflict	  as	  deadly	  and	  threatening	  to	  the	  wellbeing	  of	  the	  country	  in	  question.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  previous	  studies	  have	  suggested	  that	  gender,	  age,	  and	  the	  economic	  situation	  of	  individuals	  don’t	  have	  a	  significant	  effect	  on	  one’s	  likeliness	  to	  rally.	  In	  this	  paper	  I	  uncovered	  both	  similarities	  and	  differences	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Russia.	  Similar	  to	  the	  case	  of	  the	  US,	  I	  find	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that	  gender	  and	  age	  does	  not	  affect	  the	  likelihood	  of	  rallying	  in	  Russia.	  Unlike	  the	  American	  case,	  however,	  I	  find	  that	  the	  degree	  of	  previous	  disapproval	  of	  the	  president	  seems	  to	  have	  no	  effect	  on	  the	  probability	  of	  rallying.	  Being	  a	  viewer	  of	  state	  TV,	  however,	  proves	  to	  have	  a	  very	  significant	  effect	  on	  the	  likelihood	  that	  individuals	  will	  rally.	  Furthermore,	  the	  Russian	  case	  demonstrates	  that	  the	  individuals	  who	  rallied	  expressed	  much	  more	  nationalist	  sentiment	  and	  pride	  in	  Russia	  than	  those	  who	  didn’t	  change	  their	  opinion	  about	  the	  president;	  they	  perceived	  themselves	  as	  belonging	  to	  the	  Russian	  state,	  Russian	  ethnicity,	  and	  Russian	  Orthodox	  Church.	  And	  though	  a	  similar	  result	  was	  found	  in	  the	  US	  as	  well,	  its	  effect	  in	  Russia	  is	  bigger	  and	  more	  significant.	  This	  finding,	  though	  not	  unexpected,	  points	  to	  the	  power	  of	  patriotism	  and	  nationalist	  sentiment	  in	  the	  country	  that	  remains	  in	  full	  effect	  a	  year	  after	  the	  start	  of	  the	  crisis	  despite	  a	  worsening	  economic	  situation.	  The	  power	  of	  patriotism	  can	  thus	  also	  explain	  the	  somewhat	  counterintuitive	  change	  of	  opinion	  about	  the	  president	  among	  recently	  passionate	  regime	  opponents.	  It	  seems	  that	  when	  a	  conflict	  is	  presented	  to	  the	  population	  as	  a	  struggle	  between	  “us”	  and	  “them”,	  strife	  between	  Russia	  and	  the	  West,	  and	  an	  attack	  by	  the	  West	  on	  Russia,	  even	  former	  regime	  opponents	  are	  willing	  to	  rethink	  their	  opinion	  about	  the	  president	  and	  rally	  around	  the	  Russian	  flag.	  	  One	  of	  the	  possible	  explanations	  of	  the	  salience	  of	  nationalistic	  sentiment	  might	  lie	  in	  the	  regime	  type.	  Leaders	  of	  different	  regimes	  often	  play	  the	  patriotism	  card,	  which	  remains	  a	  very	  strong	  motivation	  to	  rally	  around	  the	  president	  in	  the	  face	  of	  an	  international	  crisis;	  but	  is	  the	  endurance	  of	  this	  patriotism	  appeal	  the	  same	  in	  all	  rally	  cases?	  When	  analyzing	  the	  Persian	  Gulf	  War	  and	  the	  rallying	  effect	  in	  the	  US	  that	  followed,	  Parker	  (1995)	  notes	  that	  most	  of	  the	  rallying	  was	  gone	  within	  the	  first	  10	  months	  after	  the	  conflict.	  	  Similarly,	  McLeod,	  Eveland,	  and	  Signorielli	  (1994)	  found	  that	  a	  year	  after	  the	  Gulf	  War,	  the	  support	  for	  the	  president	  returned	  to	  its	  pre-­‐conflict	  levels	  and	  the	  rallying	  effect	  dissipated.	  Today	  in	  Russia,	  more	  than	  a	  year	  after	  the	  controversial	  referendum	  in	  Crimea,	  Putin’s	  popularity	  and	  support	  ratings	  continue	  to	  hover	  around	  90	  percent.12	  This	  post-­‐crisis	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  http://www.levada.ru/25-­‐03-­‐2015/martovskie-­‐reitingi-­‐odobreniya-­‐i-­‐doveriya	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timeframe	  in	  Russia	  thus	  differs	  from	  what	  previous	  studies	  found	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  US.	  More	  research	  is	  necessary	  to	  draw	  definitive	  conclusions	  about	  the	  consistency	  of	  such	  outcomes	  and	  to	  conclusively	  tie	  them	  to	  regime	  types,	  but	  one	  of	  the	  explanations	  might	  be	  the	  varying	  durability	  of	  the	  rallying	  effect	  in	  democracies	  and	  competitive	  authoritarian	  regimes.	  As	  Levy	  and	  Vakili	  noted,	  using	  patriotic	  sentiment	  is	  a	  popular	  means	  of	  legitimizing	  a	  leader’s	  actions	  in	  authoritarian	  regimes.	  This	  logically	  follows	  because	  authoritarian	  regimes	  have	  to	  rely	  more	  on	  exploiting	  patriotic	  feelings	  than	  on	  the	  ballot	  box	  for	  legitimacy.	  Thus,	  putting	  additional	  stress	  on	  the	  feelings	  of	  patriotism	  and	  national	  belonging	  might	  explain	  the	  more	  durable	  and	  stronger	  rallying	  effect.	  	  Another	  possible	  explanation	  of	  why	  the	  rallying	  effect	  in	  Russia	  might	  be	  more	  durable	  than	  in	  the	  US	  is	  the	  two	  countries’	  contrasting	  political	  systems.	  While	  the	  US	  system	  is	  much	  more	  conflicted	  and	  divided	  and	  is	  characterized	  by	  distinct	  bipartisanship,	  in	  Russia,	  despite	  the	  existence	  of	  both	  the	  systemic	  and	  non-­‐system	  opposition,	  there	  is	  hardly	  any	  real	  alternative	  to	  the	  ruling	  regime.	  Thus,	  the	  post-­‐crisis	  dissipation	  of	  the	  rallying	  effect	  in	  the	  US	  might	  be	  characterized	  primarily	  by	  the	  decrease	  in	  the	  presidential	  popularity	  among	  the	  representatives	  and	  supporters	  of	  the	  opposing	  party.	  In	  Russia,	  due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  clear	  and	  powerful	  opposition,	  such	  transition	  fails	  to	  happen,	  which	  potentially	  causes	  the	  rallying	  effect	  to	  last	  longer.	  	  	  Yet	  another	  possible	  explanation	  of	  the	  notable	  durability	  of	  the	  rallying	  effect	  in	  Russia	  might	  be	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  rally	  event	  itself.	  In	  his	  research,	  Lee	  (1977)	  points	  out	  the	  artificiality	  of	  the	  assumption	  that	  different	  types	  of	  international	  crises	  lead	  to	  the	  same	  impact	  on	  the	  population	  reaction	  and	  the	  durability	  of	  this	  reaction.	  Instead,	  he	  suggests	  six	  categories	  of	  international	  events	  that	  lead	  to	  varying	  staying	  power	  of	  the	  rallying	  effect:	  “(1)	  wars	  and	  military	  crises	  that	  included	  actual	  or	  potential	  involvement	  of	  US	  troops;	  (2)	  end	  of	  a	  war	  or	  military	  conflict	  that	  involved	  US	  forces;	  (3)	  summit	  conferences	  between	  the	  US	  and	  other	  powers;	  (4)	  new	  foreign	  policy	  bills	  that	  attract	  the	  attention	  of	  general	  public;	  (5)	  international	  setbacks	  or	  achievements;	  and	  (6)	  events	  that	  directly	  involve	  the	  president,	  such	  as	  assassination	  attempts.”	  He	  then	  notes	  that	  “[t]he	  events	  that	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tend	  to	  have	  relatively	  lasting	  impact	  on	  presidential	  popularity	  are	  wars	  and	  military	  crises,	  with	  the	  average	  duration	  of	  five	  months.”	  The	  classification	  proposed	  by	  Lee	  does	  not	  include,	  however,	  non-­‐military	  terrorist	  attacks.	  And	  though	  the	  examples	  he	  analyzed	  in	  his	  work	  fit	  perfectly	  in	  the	  described	  categories,	  the	  rally	  event	  that	  followed	  the	  tragedy	  of	  the	  9/11	  terrorist	  attack	  may	  ask	  for	  a	  new	  category.	  	  The	  crisis	  that	  claimed	  thousands	  of	  civilian	  lives	  took	  place	  in	  the	  US	  itself	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  foreign	  country	  like	  Iraq,	  thus	  making	  it	  much	  more	  real	  to	  the	  broad	  population.	  Such	  geographical	  proximity	  and	  unequalled	  relevance	  of	  the	  event	  has	  hardly	  been	  the	  case	  during	  the	  Iraq	  crises	  in	  the	  1990s	  as	  well	  as	  those	  that	  followed	  9/11.	  The	  terrorism	  threat	  from	  outside	  the	  country	  activated	  the	  “us”	  versus	  “them”	  mentality	  that	  facilitated	  and	  enhanced	  patriotic	  feelings.	  As	  a	  result,	  George	  Bush’s	  popularity	  not	  only	  leapt	  and	  reached	  an	  astonishing	  high	  of	  90%,	  but	  remained	  at	  a	  high	  level	  for	  much	  longer	  than	  five	  months;	  it	  wasn’t	  until	  September	  2003,	  exactly	  two	  years	  after	  the	  attack,	  that	  presidential	  popularity	  rating	  returned	  to	  its	  pre-­‐crisis	  levels.13	  	  What	  is	  equally	  important,	  Bush’s	  high	  popularity	  level	  was	  coupled	  with	  an	  (admittedly	  mild)	  economic	  recession	  in	  the	  country,	  a	  recession	  which,	  nevertheless,	  failed	  to	  bring	  down	  presidential	  approval	  ratings.14	  	  The	  rallying	  instance	  in	  Russia	  analyzed	  in	  this	  paper	  seems	  to	  have	  some	  characteristics	  in	  common	  with	  the	  2001	  crisis	  in	  the	  US.	  Though	  the	  crisis	  began	  over	  Crimea,	  which	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  March	  2014	  was	  still	  Ukrainian	  territory,	  it	  very	  soon	  became	  Russian	  and	  thus	  shifted	  the	  crisis	  from	  happening	  on	  foreign	  land	  to	  occurring	  in	  Russia.	  The	  vocal	  condemnation	  of	  the	  international	  community,	  coupled	  with	  Russia’s	  broad	  anti-­‐sanctions	  that	  affected	  the	  general	  population	  and	  the	  state	  media	  presentation	  of	  the	  crisis	  as	  an	  unjustified	  attack	  by	  the	  West,	  served	  as	  a	  spark	  that	  triggered	  the	  “us”	  versus	  ”them”	  mindset.	  These	  similarities	  between	  the	  two	  cases	  (post-­‐9/11	  US	  and	  the	  one	  described	  throughout	  this	  paper)	  lead	  me	  to	  suspect	  that	  it	  is	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  rally	  event	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13http://www.gallup.com/poll/116500/presidential-­‐approval-­‐ratings-­‐george-­‐bush.aspx	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determines	  the	  durability	  of	  the	  consequent	  surge	  in	  presidential	  popularity.	  Further	  research	  is,	  however,	  necessary	  to	  definitively	  talk	  about	  the	  interconnection	  between	  the	  two	  factors.	  	  Yet	  the	  biggest	  difference	  between	  Russia	  and	  the	  US	  that	  has	  the	  most	  significant	  political	  implications	  lies	  in	  the	  sphere	  of	  economics.	  Whereas	  Parker	  (1995)	  demonstrated	  that	  individuals’	  economic	  situation	  has	  little	  affect	  on	  the	  likelihood	  of	  rallying	  in	  the	  US	  (where	  the	  population	  is	  willing	  to	  put	  their	  financial	  grievances	  aside	  and	  support	  the	  president	  in	  times	  of	  crisis),	  the	  situation	  looks	  reversed	  in	  Russia.	  My	  results	  show	  that	  positive	  change	  (or	  lack	  of	  negative	  change)	  in	  the	  financial	  situation	  of	  an	  individual	  is	  the	  strongest	  predictor	  of	  rallying	  in	  the	  country.	  With	  the	  number	  of	  people	  living	  below	  or	  just	  around	  the	  poverty	  line	  higher	  than	  that	  in	  the	  US,	  the	  economy	  is	  what	  matters	  for	  the	  population.	  Therefore,	  it’s	  more	  likely	  that	  any	  (even	  slight)	  change	  in	  an	  individual’s	  economic	  situation	  will	  be	  felt	  much	  more	  acutely	  than	  in	  the	  US.	  While	  people	  remain	  better	  off	  or	  their	  financial	  situation	  improves,	  they	  will	  be	  wiling	  to	  change	  their	  opinion	  about	  the	  president	  for	  the	  better	  and	  rally	  round	  the	  Russian	  flag.	  	  The	  findings	  have	  important	  political	  implications	  for	  Russia.	  If	  it	  is	  the	  economy	  that	  matters	  the	  most	  for	  the	  population	  and	  determines	  whether	  more	  people	  will	  rally	  and	  support	  the	  president,	  the	  coming	  year	  might	  bring	  bad	  news	  for	  the	  regime.	  According	  to	  Synovate	  ComCon,	  in	  January	  2015	  the	  number	  of	  people	  whose	  economic	  situation	  declined	  has	  reached	  an	  all-­‐time	  (since	  they	  began	  monitoring	  in	  2008)	  high	  of	  65%	  (as	  opposed	  to	  the	  average	  of	  35%	  since	  2009).	  This	  might	  mean	  a	  gradual	  decline	  in	  the	  president’s	  popularity	  and	  slow	  drop	  in	  his	  support.	  However,	  Putin’s	  popularity	  ratings	  in	  January	  2015	  show	  that	  the	  number	  of	  people	  who	  support	  him,	  following	  a	  slight	  dip	  at	  the	  very	  end	  of	  2014,	  is	  back	  in	  the	  upper-­‐eighties.15	  But	  despite	  the	  seeming	  contradiction,	  these	  numbers	  don’t	  counter	  my	  expectations	  for	  two	  reasons.	  First,	  one	  should	  take	  into	  account	  the	  lag	  between	  the	  worsening	  economic	  situation	  of	  the	  population	  and	  the	  drop	  in	  the	  president’s	  popularity	  ratings,	  which	  takes	  time	  and	  might	  still	  follow.	  And	  second,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  bear	  in	  mind	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  http://www.levada.ru/25-­‐03-­‐2015/martovskie-­‐reitingi-­‐odobreniya-­‐i-­‐doveriya	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the	  way	  the	  so-­‐called	  “anti-­‐sanctions”	  were	  presented	  and	  described	  to	  the	  Russian	  population	  by	  the	  government.	  When	  in	  August	  2014	  Russia	  effectively	  banned	  most	  food	  produce	  coming	  from	  the	  EU,	  the	  US,	  and	  a	  number	  of	  other	  countries	  that	  joined	  the	  anti-­‐Russian	  sanctions,	  Russians	  didn’t	  notice	  at	  first.	  Foreign	  food	  was	  still	  available	  in	  the	  stores	  since	  supermarkets	  had	  impressive	  supplies	  and	  didn’t	  immediately	  raise	  prices	  for	  both	  foreign	  and	  domestic	  products.	  Weeks	  later,	  however,	  as	  familiar	  foreign	  food	  started	  to	  disappear	  from	  the	  stores	  at	  a	  fast	  pace	  and	  the	  prices	  for	  Russian	  goods	  gradually	  increased,	  the	  general	  population	  started	  to	  get	  nervous—the	  sanctions	  no	  longer	  affected	  just	  the	  chosen	  few	  from	  Putin’s	  inner	  circle,	  but	  more	  and	  more	  people	  were	  beginning	  to	  feel	  the	  consequences	  of	  the	  geopolitical	  conflict.	  	  According	  to	  Grauvogel	  and	  von	  Soerst	  (2013),	  only	  broad	  sanctions	  (as	  opposed	  to	  targeted)	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  spark	  a	  strong	  rallying	  effect	  in	  authoritarian	  regimes.	  For	  that	  to	  happen,	  the	  authoritarian	  leader	  must	  be	  perceived	  as	  a	  strong	  legitimate	  leader.	  If	  we	  look	  at	  the	  Russian	  case,	  we	  see	  that	  Putin	  initially	  had	  only	  the	  former	  –	  he	  was	  viewed	  as	  a	  legitimate	  leader;	  the	  sanctions	  imposed	  by	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  US,	  however,	  were	  very	  targeted	  and	  hurt	  Putin’s	  inner	  circle	  and	  certain	  companies	  owned	  by	  his	  associates	  as	  well	  as	  a	  number	  of	  banks	  and	  oil	  companies.	  They	  very	  soon	  turned	  into	  broad	  sanctions	  when	  the	  Russian	  government	  introduced	  the	  “anti-­‐sanctions”	  and	  effectively	  banned	  the	  import	  of	  most	  of	  Western	  European	  and	  American	  food	  products	  into	  the	  country.	  And	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  anti-­‐sanctions	  were	  entirely	  the	  initiative	  of	  the	  Russian	  government,	  they	  were	  presented	  to	  the	  population	  as	  the	  only	  way	  to	  “repel	  the	  aggression	  of	  the	  West”	  and	  not	  surrender	  to	  the	  “intrusive	  demands”	  of	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  US.	  Therefore,	  the	  regime	  managed	  to	  transform	  very	  targeted	  sanctions	  into	  broad	  ones	  that	  affected	  most	  of	  the	  country’s	  population.	  As	  a	  result,	  both	  conditions	  for	  the	  occurrence	  of	  the	  rally-­‐round-­‐the-­‐flag	  effect,	  mentioned	  by	  Grauvogel	  and	  von	  Soerst,	  were	  present	  in	  Russia	  as	  former	  regime	  opponents	  changed	  their	  opinion	  about	  Putin.	  Thus,	  the	  non-­‐fading	  popularity	  ratings	  that	  we	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observe	  today	  might	  be	  the	  aftermath	  of	  an	  impressive	  reframing	  campaign	  that	  has	  managed	  to	  be	  extremely	  effective	  thus	  far.	  	  The	  results	  of	  my	  research	  point	  to	  two	  possible	  outcomes	  for	  the	  regime	  in	  the	  near	  future	  depending	  on	  what	  has	  more	  weight	  for	  the	  Russian	  population,	  financial	  grievances	  or	  feelings	  of	  patriotism	  and	  national	  pride.	  If	  the	  deteriorating	  financial	  situation	  dominates	  the	  feelings	  of	  patriotism,	  we	  might	  expect	  a	  decline	  in	  presidential	  popularity	  in	  the	  coming	  months.	  However,	  if	  national	  pride	  proves	  to	  carry	  more	  weight	  for	  Russians	  and	  leads	  them	  to	  put	  their	  economic	  grievances	  aside,	  then	  we	  should	  expect	  continued	  high	  presidential	  ratings	  and	  the	  unfading	  support	  of	  the	  president	  despite	  the	  non-­‐vanishing	  economic	  crisis.	  Hence,	  the	  question	  remains	  of	  which	  frame	  is	  stronger	  and	  will	  have	  more	  lasting	  effects:	  that	  of	  nationalist	  sentiment	  or	  that	  of	  financial	  hardship.	  	  	  Further	  research	  is	  necessary	  to	  study	  the	  rally-­‐round-­‐the-­‐flag	  effect	  in	  Russia.	  A	  number	  of	  important	  questions	  remain:	  Is	  the	  Russian	  case	  illustrative	  of	  other	  authoritarian	  regimes?	  Can	  the	  obtained	  results	  be	  applicable	  to	  other	  Eastern	  European	  countries?	  Since	  this	  paper	  looked	  at	  the	  change	  of	  opinion	  for	  the	  better,	  my	  results	  don’t	  look	  at	  and	  establish	  a	  relationship	  between	  changing	  economic	  situation	  and	  opposing	  the	  regime.	  Thus,	  another	  series	  of	  questions	  arises:	  Will	  the	  worsening	  economic	  situation	  lead	  to	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  opposition?	  How	  will	  the	  regime	  respond	  to	  the	  declining	  popularity	  ratings?	  Are	  Western	  sanctions	  effective	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  strong	  authoritarian	  regime	  or	  are	  they	  instrumental	  in	  strengthening	  the	  regime?	  I	  hope	  that	  in	  the	  coming	  years	  I	  will	  have	  a	  chance	  to	  answer	  some	  of	  these	  important	  questions.	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